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Introduction 
  
 Clausewitz’s writings have long been the subject of scholarly debate. Historians and 
political scientists alike have expressed a spectrum of views on the relevance of his theories on 
modern conflicts. Some have argued that Clausewitz’s On War is replete with so many 
theoretical axioms and exceptions that anyone can claim Clausewitzian principles support their 
view on a military conflict.1 Conversely, others have claimed that the lessons contained therein 
show “a theory of war, the elements of which appear to be universal and timeless.”2 John Keegan 
is perhaps the most prominent anti-Clausewitz military historian. In his expansive The History of 
War, he criticized one of Clausewitz’s most prolific contributions to the study of armed conflict: 
the notion that “war is the continuation of politics by other means.”3 For Keegan, culture was 
“the great determinant of how human beings conduct themselves,” and Clausewitz failed to 
acknowledge that war was “always an expression of culture,” not politics. Likewise, Keegan 
claimed that Clausewitz evaluated only regular warfare, excluding unconventional actors such as 
the Cossacks.4 This view has been flatly rejected by scholars who claim Keegan undervalued the 
complexity of Clausewitz’s military philosophy and failed to acknowledge the relationship 
between culture and policy.5  
However, not all commentators adopt a black-or-white view of Clausewitz. Manabrata 
Guha, for example, has argued that Clausewitzian theory is durable because Clausewitz expected 
 
1 Bruce Fleming, “Can Reading Clausewitz Save Us From Future Mistakes?” Parameters 34, (Spring 
2004). 
2 Mackubin Thomas Owens, “The Main Thing,” The National Review, March 28, 2003, 
https://www.nationalreview.com/2003/03/main-thing-mackubin-thomas-owens/.  
3 Carl Von Clausewitz, On War, trans./ed. Michael Eliot Howard, Peter Paret (New York: Princeton 
University Press, 1976), 87.  
4 John Keegan, “What is War?” in A History of Warfare (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1993), 3-12. 
5 Jim Byrne, “Keegan Versus Von Clausewitz,” clausewitz.com, April 24, 1999,  
http://www.clausewitz.com/readings/Bassford/Keegan/ByrneArt.htm.  
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the character of war – who wages it, how it is waged – to change, while the nature of it – the 
concepts that govern war – remains the same.6 There are many who claim that while particular 
aspects of the theory are still relevant, they have been misinterpreted by the military leadership. 
Colin Fleming has asserted that the concept of the Trinity – the wartime balance among the 
people, the government, and the army – has been misconstrued, and the original idea remains 
applicable today.7 Likewise, Antulio Echevarria has highlighted how the “center of gravity” 
concept continues to inform perspectives on contemporary conflicts.8 I share in the view that 
certain Clausewitzian principles remain relevant today, and will evaluate several concepts from 
Clausewitz’s magnum opus, On War. The scope of this project will be limited to three of 
Clausewitz’s views on military conflict, and they will be evaluated in both the Soviet and 
American wars in Afghanistan. This study will reveal important insights into both conflicts and 
will also reinforce the view that Clausewitz’s On War remains a source of guidance for modern 
conflict.    
Both the Soviet and US armed forces at times relied heavily on conventional strategies 
and tactics in conflicts that turned into unconventional wars with insurgent groups. Conventional 
warfare is defined by an absence of guerilla/insurgent fighting and is “conducted without the use 
of nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons.”9 “Unconventional warfare” refers to “activities 
conducted to enable a resistance movement or insurgency to coerce, disrupt, or overthrow a 
 
6 Manabrata Guha, Reimagining War in the 21st Century: From Clausewitz to Network-Centric Warfare 
(Routledge: Abingdon, 2011), 169-70.  
7 Colin M. Fleming, Clausewitz’s Timeless Trinity: A Framework for Modern War (UK: Ashgate, 2014), 
1. 
8 Antulio J. Echevarria II., "'Reining in' the Center of Gravity Concept," Air & Space Power Journal, 
(Summer 2003), Gale Onefile.  
9 The Oxford Essential Dictionary of the U.S. Military, s.v. “conventional war,” accessed February 15, 
2020, https://www.oxfordreference.com/view/10.1093/acref/9780199891580.001.0001/acref-97801998 
91580-e-1951?rskey=Sjc8rZ&result=1873.  
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government or occupying power by operating through or with an underground, auxiliary, and 
guerrilla force in a denied area.”10 According to the U.S. Department of Defense, an 
“insurgency” is defined as “the organized use of subversion and violence to seize, nullify, or 
challenge political control of a region.”11 Conversely, “counterinsurgency” or “COIN” refers to  
“comprehensive civilian and military efforts designed to simultaneously defeat and contain 
insurgency and address its root causes.”12 A similar term that will be used in this paper is 
“irregular warfare,” which describes “a violent struggle among state and non-state actors for 
legitimacy and influence over the relevant population(s).”13  
In a 2014 article titled “From Limited War to Limited Victory: Clausewitz and Allied 
Strategy in Afghanistan,” Christopher Griffin argues that Clausewitz’s theories have been 
undervalued by some modern scholars, and highlights several Clausewitzian principles that can 
be used to help explain the ISAF experience in Afghanistan.14 In this paper, I will apply several 
of these concepts to the Soviet experience in Afghanistan. I will also revise and add to Dr. 
Griffin’s analysis of the war against the Taliban. While I agree with most of Griffin’s assertions, 
there are some areas of disagreement. Clausewitz defined the “culminating point” as the moment 
at which an offensive has reached its maximum point of defensible extension.15 I offer a clearer 
culminating point, whereas Griffin says only that the chances for a culminating point of victory 
passed the U.S. after 2006. 
 
10 Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, 
(Washington DC: The Joint Staff), https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Doctrine/pubs/dic 
tionary.pdf, 223. 
11 Ibid., 106.  
12 Ibid., 52.  
13 Ibid., 112. 
14 Christopher Griffin, “From Limited War to Limited Victory: Clausewitz and Allied Strategy in 
Afghanistan,” Contemporary Security Policy 35, no.3 (2014): 446-467.  
15 Clausewitz, On War, 639.  
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 I also offer a method of comparison that uses Clausewitz’s culminating points and an 
“counterinsurgent acceptance point” (CAP) to identify analogous points in the Soviet and 
American wars in Afghanistan. The CAP is my own idea. I believe it is an appropriate 
counterpoint to the culminating point, which for both the Soviets and Americans occurred right 
before the respective armies transitioned from largely conventional warfare to 
counterinsurgency. The CAP then marks the turning point when the insurgents denied the 
counterinsurgents a strictly military victory, and the political leadership was forced to publicly 
acknowledge the failure of the COIN policy for the first time. I believe these two points of 
comparison can be used in comparative studies of other conflicts as well.  
In Chapter 2, I consider the perspective Clausewitz had on force size and concentration as 
it applies to both conflicts. Clausewitz advocated for the use of overwhelming force that was 
concentrated in the regions that posed the greatest threat to the objectives of the invading state. 
An analysis of Soviet and American troop deployments and resources will reveal how both 
countries failed to deploy an adequate force into Afghanistan early in the war, and were unable 
to concentrate troops in the problem regions. I will also argue that both the Soviet and American 
leadership were made aware of the Clausewitzian view on mass and concentration by members 
of the military, but disregarded it in favor of a modest deployment and concentration approach.  
In Chapter 3, I analyze Clausewitz’s war aims framework, which describes the trajectory 
warfighting should follow, and the importance of maintaining parity between political and 
military aims and the means deployed to achieve them. I argue that – while there were significant 
differences between U.S. and Soviet objectives throughout each conflict – both struggled to 
adapt their goals and methods. A key aspect of Clausewitz’s war aims framework is the 
increasingly political nature a conflict takes on once military objectives prove impossible to 
  5 
attain. This seemingly basic concept sheds light on the quagmires both superpowers experienced 
in Afghanistan.    
Literature Review 
Insurgencies have occurred around the world for hundreds of years. Logically, the study 
of insurgencies has ebbed and flowed with their prevalence. Most of these popular uprisings 
have been unsuccessful.16 In the 20th century, the aftermath of World War I “created the opening 
and opportunities within international politics for revolutionaries to seize and hold power,” but 
with few exceptions – southern Ireland and China – the rebellions were crushed.17 Up until the 
1960s, insurgencies were on the periphery of military study, growing in popularity after the end 
of the Cold War and once again with the wars in Afghanistan (2001-Present) and Iraq (2003-
Present).18 Scholars, insurgents, and counterinsurgents have presented many frameworks and 
theories that consider this type of warfare from multiple perspectives.  
One of the earliest modern guides to insurgencies was Mao Zedong’s On Guerilla 
Warfare. Written as an instruction manual for successful insurrection while Mao led the 
Communist guerillas in China during the 1930s, it describes the stages of rebellion and the 
transition from irregular to regular warfare over the course of a “protracted war.”19 David Galula, 
a French officer who based his theories on the Algerian revolution, wrote another foundational 
text for the study of irregular conflict. His Counter-Insurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice 
was published in 1964. It offered a framework for rooting out insurgencies that emphasized an 
 
16 Christian P. Potholm, Winning at War: Seven Keys to Military Victory Throughout History (Lanham, 
MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2010), 202. 
17 Paul B. Rich and Isabelle Duyvesteyn, “The Study of Insurgency and Counterinsurgency,” in The 
Routledge Handbook of Insurgency and Counterinsurgency (London: Routledge, 2012), 4. 
18 Ibid., 2.  
19 Mao Tse-Tung, On Guerrilla Warfare, trans. Samuel B. Griffith (New York: Praeger, 1961).  
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extended time commitment and holistic “clear, hold, build” strategies for the counterinsurgents.20 
Seen as a bedrock of modern COIN strategy, his guide heavily influenced Army Field Manual 3-
24, the U.S. Army’s 2006 framework for addressing the insurgencies in Iraq and Afghanistan.21 
Written by General Petraus and James Amos, Manual 3-24 sought to provide a framework that 
would inform the U.S. military on how to combine “combat tasks and skills more often 
associated with nonmilitary agencies” to defeat insurgencies.22   
Either explicitly or implicitly, Clausewitz’s influence can be seen in all these texts. Mao 
Zedong’s On Guerilla Warfare drew heavily from On War, including the chapter that directly 
addresses insurgent uprisings: “The People In Arms.”23 Likewise, John Galula’s Counter-
Insurgency Warfare – cited extensively in Army Field Manual 3-24 – adapted Clausewitz’s 
definition of war to define insurgency as “the pursuit of the policy of a party, inside a country, by 
every means.”24 Moreover, in 2014, in line with Clausewitz’s emphasis on the political aspects 
of military conflict, the Army Field Manual 3-24 was updated to include a greater focus on the 
political objectives of COIN policy.25 As for direct study of Clausewitz, it was only in the late 
1970s that American and British scholars began to analyze his work. Jan Willem Honig and 
others have observed that the publication of Michael Howard and Peter Paret’s 1976 translation 
 
20 David Galula, Counter-Insurgent Warfare: Theory and Practice, (London: Praeger Security 
International, 2006). 
21 Christian P. Potholm, Understanding War, (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 2016), 108. 
22 David H. Petraeus, James F. Amos, Field Manual 3-24: Counterinsurgency, (Washington D.C.: Dept. 
of the Army, 2006), 2.  
23 Potholm, Understanding War, 108.  
24 Galula, Counter-Insurgent Warfare, 1.  
25 Tony Fry, Unstaging War, Confronting Conflict and Peace (Cham, Switzerland: Palgrave Macmillan, 
2019), 87. 
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of On War sparked the “Clausewitz Renaissance.”26 Widely accepted as the standard translation, 
this edition will be used for my study.  
In 2015, Christopher Daase and James W. Davis translated and edited On Small War, a 
collection of Clausewitz’s lecture notes and memoranda concerning small-unit and militia 
warfare, as well as a new translation of “The People in Arms,” the only chapter from On War 
explicitly about asymmetric, unconventional conflict.27 While these texts pertain more closely to 
irregular warfare, they have been studied and debated extensively. Hence, my study will look at 
several other concepts in On War that I believe are applicable to the wars in Afghanistan, despite 
lying outside of Clausewitz’s writings explicitly concerning irregular conflict. 
Research Questions 
1. Do parts of Carl von Clausewitz’s On War remain relevant to contemporary 
counterinsurgencies?  
2. Using Clausewitz’s concepts of culminating points, mass & concentration, and war aims, 
what insights can be gained from a comparative analysis of the Soviet and American wars 
in Afghanistan?  
Thesis 
 In this paper, I will argue the following: 
 A. Certain Clausewitzian concepts apply to modern insurgencies and can be used to help 
explain the military failure in Afghanistan. I will evaluate the application of Clausewitz’s 
 
26 Jan Willem Honig, “Clausewitz’s On War: Problems of Text and Translation,” in Clausewitz in the 
Twenty-First Century, ed. Hew Strachan and Andreas Herberg-Rothe (Oxford: Oxford UP, 2007), 73. 
Note: For more on the debate regarding Clausewitz’s relevance to contemporary conflict, see 
“Introduction.” 
27 Carl von Clausewitz, Clausewitz on Small War, ed. Christopher Daase and James W. Davis (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2015). 
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culminating points, mass & concentration, and war aims to the Soviet and American wars in 
Afghanistan. 
 B. Identifying when a non-military resolution to a conflict becomes a choice the political 
leadership accepts – referred to as the “counterinsurgent acceptance point” (CAP) in this study – 
is an idea I have developed that provides a point of comparison to the culminating point. 
Considered together, the culminating point and counterinsurgent acceptance point provide a 
standardized model for comparative conflict analysis that can be applied to other wars as a 
means to identify analogous moments across many conflicts. 
Methodology & Scope 
 This study will focus on the military developments in the Soviet (1979-1989) and the 
U.S. (2001-Present) wars in Afghanistan, and will use Carl Von Clausewitz’s theories to explain 
some of the shortcomings of the counterinsurgents in both conflicts. Some scholars have decried 
the lack of case studies about insurgencies.28 This study will seek to contribute to the literature 
on the enduring concepts that have defined contemporary insurgencies. The Soviet and American 
experiences present two instances in which global superpowers attempted – and failed – to 
achieve their military objectives against insurgents. Given these events, Afghanistan remains one 
of the world’s most complex geopolitical issues. The wars I will be analyzing present a unique 
opportunity to study two irregular conflicts within one country. To this end, my paper will look 
at primary and secondary sources that detail the decisions of the respective militaries and 
insurgents. Political and military histories as well as interviews and documents will be used to 
provide context and evidence for this study. In regard to scope, the first chapter will limit the 
paper to an evaluation of military decisions up until the counterinsurgent acceptance point in 
 
28 See Ian Beckett, “The Historiography of Insurgency,” in The Routledge Handbook of Insurgency and 
Counterinsurgency (Florence: Routledge, 2012). 
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each conflict (February 1987 and September 2007, respectively). This time frame provides 
distinct points of comparison and allows Clausewitz’s concepts to be evaluated with events for 
which there is a substantial body of information available. Limiting my analysis up to the CAP 
thereby permits more recent developments in the U.S. war in Afghanistan – which lack extensive 
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Chapter I  
The Soviet and American Wars in Afghanistan: Points of Comparison 
 
Culminating Points  
 
In On War, Carl Von Clausewitz’s seminal treatise on armed conflict, Clausewitz 
discusses the numerous elements that make up offensive and defensive military operations. Book 
Seven, Chapters Five and Twenty-Two present his culminating point theory. Clausewitz writes 
that often during offensive operations, “the force of an attack gradually diminishes” and the 
“advantages that may become valuable at the peace table” must be paid for “on the spot.”29 
According to him, unlike the rare culminating point of victory (which will be discussed later in 
this chapter), most armies achieve a culminating point “where their remaining strength is just 
enough to maintain a defense and wait for peace.”30 Any progress by the aggressor after the 
culminating point has been attained is increasingly susceptible to a reversal in fortune, as the 
invading army’s energy and resources decline over the course of an offensive.31 The following 
section identifies the initial Soviet and American culminating points in Afghanistan, and also 
assesses whether they met, surpassed, or fell short of the respective armies capabilities at the 
time. Deciphering and analyzing the moment at which the prospects for achieving military 
objectives were highest will provide a point of comparison to when the situation began to favor 
the insurgency.      
There are always debates on whether a military offensive reached, surpassed, or fell short 
of the ideal culminating point. For example, some argue that the U.S. overstepped its initial 
military successes during the Korean War (1950-53) and fell short of further success in the First 
 
29 Clausewitz, On War, 639. 
30 Ibid. 
31 Ibid. 
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Gulf War (1990-91). In Korea, the U.S. army has been criticized for pushing too far north and 
overextending itself.32 This extension beyond the true culminating point, it has been claimed, led 
to higher casualties and ultimately a weaker negotiating position. The First Gulf War, on the 
other hand, saw U.S. forces attain their military objectives, but – despite their capabilities – 
decide not to pursue and destroy Saddam Hussein’s forces in Iraq. In this case, it has been 
alleged that the culminating point was not attained.33 While they are debatable and difficult to 
pinpoint, culminating points nonetheless provide a period of time that can be useful in evaluating 
the high-water marks of military operations to better understand conflicts and their most difficult 
military questions.  
 In the Soviet war in Afghanistan, February 1980 can be considered as the culminating 
point for the Soviet Union because it occurred after the 40th Army took control of the cities and 
main roads, and before it embarked on the many unsuccessful forays into rebel territory. These 
later attempts at achieving military objectives would come to define the conflict and lead to the 
army’s retreat. The major operations after February 1980 failed to gain territory for the 
communist government, and the few garrisons that were established in the rural parts of the 
country did not yield any strategic or tactical advantages for the Soviets. In the U.S. war in 
Afghanistan, the United States reached its culminating point in December 2001, when the 
Taliban gave up its last stronghold in Kandahar province. The resurgence of the Taliban since 
then has prevented the U.S. and its allies from achieving the broad territorial control and stability 
the U.S. army possessed during the first two months after its invasion. Before an analysis of the 
wars in Afghanistan can be undertaken, a historical overview of the conflict is necessary.   
 
32 Patrick J. Garrity, “The Parameters of Victory,” Claremont Review of Books, August 15, 2012, 
https://claremontreviewofbooks.com/digital/the-parameters-of-victory/.  
33 Ibid. 
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 Historical Background to the Soviet Culminating Point 
 
The last king of Afghanistan, Zahir Shah, ruled from 1933-1973, overseeing an 
expansion of the central government and the creation of economic infrastructure and state 
institutions. The reach of the national government was limited by access and resources, however, 
and traditional tribal structures and practices governed the rural regions where Kabul’s presence 
was virtually nonexistent.34 Notably, the King’s four decade reign was a time of unusual peace in 
Afghanistan. Prior to Shah’s reign, the British clashed with Afghan troops in three separate 
conflicts between 1830 and 1920, ending with the Anglo-Afghan Treaty of 1919, which formally 
delineated an independent Afghanistan from British India. In the 1960s, Shah instituted modest 
reforms that led to political liberalization, enhanced the education system, and provided new 
voting rights for women, a move that was considered to be controversial by the more 
conservative parts of the country.35   
Zahir Shah was deposed in a bloodless coup by his brother-in-law and former prime 
minister, Daud Khan, in 1973. After Daud took power, he sought to consolidate his influence by 
banning every political party. Some Islamists were jailed, while others fled to Pakistan, where 
they sought refuge and built up their political and military resistance to the Daud regime. Ahmad 
Shah Massoud, Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, and Burhanuddin Rabbani were just a few of the 
individuals who escaped to Pakistan during this era and would go on to become key 
changemakers in Afghanistan’s future.36 Daud’s repressive tendencies, however, were not 
 
34 Ali Ahmad Jalali, A Military History of Afghanistan: From the Great Game to the Global War on 
Terror, (Kansas: University Press of Kansas, 2017), 331. 
35 Barry Bearak, “Mohammed Zahir Shah, Last Afghan King, Dies at 92,” New York Times, July 24, 
2007, accessed April 20, 2020,  https://www.nytimes.com/2007/07/24/world/asia/24shah.html?auth=lo 
gin-email.  
36 Jalali, A Military History of Afghanistan, 348. 
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limited to Islamists, as he routinely persecuted communist elements in the government and 
sought to establish ties with nearby Islamic countries.37   
Like virtually all conflicts in the second half of the 20th century, the Cold War played a 
key role in the lead up and prosecution of the Soviet war in Afghanistan. The country was an 
unaligned state under the leadership of both Shah and Daud as it sought to maximize its 
economic and military support from both the U.S. and the Soviet Union. Humorously, Daud was 
rumored to have said that he wanted “to light his American cigarette with a Russian match.”38 
Between 1935-54, there were repeated unsuccessful attempts by the Afghans to get military aid 
from the United States, which did not consider the landlocked country to be an important 
regional actor. The USSR, on the other hand, vied for influence over the country. In 1955, 
Moscow announced that Pashtunistan should be independent from Pakistan – an important 
gesture in Afghanistan’s favor – and began to provide the country with economic and military 
support.39 The United States then followed suit.  
By the 1970s, Afghanistan had a robust trade relationship with the USSR but continued 
to welcome American military advisors and economic aid.40 Seeking close ties with both 
superpowers, however, came with consequences. When Soviet Premier Leonid Brezhnev told 
Daud that he wanted the Western advisers to leave Afghanistan, Daud angrily responded that 
Afghanistan was an independent country that would not be forced to make decisions by 
foreigners.41 While this exchange soured Daud’s relationship with Brezhnev, it would be the 
 
37 Ibid., 352. 
38 Rodric Braithwaite, Afgantsy: The Russians in Afghanistan 1979-1989, (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 2011), 32. 
39 Jalali, Military History of Afghanistan, 342-344. 
40 Martin McCauley, Afghanistan and Central Asia: A Modern History, (London: Pearson Education 
Limited, 2002), 12. 
41 Braithwaite, Afgantsy, 33. 
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Afghan leader’s internal political battles that would end his reign. Despite Daud’s attempts to 
purge the government of communists, a coup by military regiments representing the People’s 
Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) led to his overthrow. Dubbed the Saur (April) 
Revolution, the events transpired in April 1978 after the PDPA leaders quickly initiated a 
military attack on Daud’s palace amidst an escalation of arrests. The communists used tanks and 
air bombers to swiftly overtake the royal palace, killing Daud and many other government 
officials.42  
The Soviet role in the revolution has been a mystery. While the USSR had supported the 
PDPA, the Soviet ambassador to Afghanistan and other senior diplomats were unaware of the 
coup until it happened.43 Tellingly, TASS, the official Soviet news agency, referred to the events 
as a “coup” and not a “people’s revolution” for the first three days after it occurred.44 The 
PDPA’s leaders, meanwhile, proclaimed the victory as a different, and perhaps even superior 
iteration of communist revolution. Nur Muhamed Taraki, who became the President and Prime 
Minister of Afghanistan following the overthrow, announced that he had added to Marxist-
Leninist theory by using the military for the socialist agenda. Other Afghan Communists 
described the Saur Revolution as equally important to the Russian October Revolution.45   
Events on the ground, however, told a different story.  As Ali Ahmad Jalali noted, “The 
Communist takeover, nevertheless, was a rebellion by the military assets of one faction of the 
Communist party with no significant following in the country and no sociopolitical prerequisites 
of a revolution.”46 Furthermore, the PDPA was split into two warring factions. Parcham (Banner) 
 
42 William Maley, The Afghanistan Wars, (New York: Palgrave, 2002), 26.   
43 Braithwaite, Afgantsy, 42. 
44 Maley, The Afghanistan Wars, 27. 
45 Jalali, Military History of Afghanistan, 357. 
46 Ibid. 
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was led by Babrak Karmal and had the support of urban intellectuals seeking rapid change. 
Khalq (Masses or People), was led by Taraki and Hafizullah Amin, and was popular amongst 
agrarian and more gradualist-minded citizens.47 While they formed a joint government, the 
Khalqists effectively exiled the most prominent Parchamists by assigning them to ambassadorial 
posts. As instability increased, the Khalq faction resorted to mass arrests and torture, persecuting 
Parchamists as well as anticommunist dissidents.48  
Soviet advisers repeatedly told Taraki to end the brutal repressions and open the party to 
a broader ideological base, but he did not heed their advice. In March 1979, the Afghan city of 
Herat and the nearby villages rebelled against the communists, sacking socialist symbols and 
murdering public officials. Fearing the mobs, Taraki desperately asked the Soviets to intervene. 
After four days of internal debate, the Politburo agreed to send extra military supplies but refused 
to send armed forces. Alexei Kosygin, the Soviet Prime Minister, told Taraki: “If we sent in our 
troops, the situation in your country would not improve...Our troops would have to struggle not 
only with an external aggressor, but with a part of your own people. And people do not forgive 
that kind of thing.”49  
In September, a KGB assessment found that the Taraki-Amin administration was losing 
popularity as they continued their repressive policies and tried to handle political problems 
militarily. It recommended that the PDPA institute reforms that would allow clergy members, 
some exiled dissidents, and minorities to become members.50 Many who opposed the PDPA 
were joining the resistance fighters, growing the armed threat to the regime. The Afghan Army 
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began to shrink, as young conscripts and their commanders defected.51 In July 1978, an anti-
communist uprising took full control of the Panjshir Valley, and the Democratic Republic of 
Afghanistan (DRA) forces were unable to retake it. The USSR was split on how to address the 
tide of issues threatening the fledgling communist state. The Soviet military was more supportive 
of the Khalq faction since the officers in the Afghan army tended to be Khalqists. The KGB, 
however, attributed the PDPA’s issues with Taraki’s repressive policies and saw Babrak Karmal 
and the Parcham faction as the preferred communist vanguard.52 In July 1979, the Carter 
administration approved about $500,000 in non-lethal aid to the rebels, formally beginning U.S. 
clandestine support for the mujahedin.53 
On October 8th, Amin’s men murdered Taraki, precipitating a series of events that led to 
the Soviet invasion. Amin did not end Taraki’s oppressive policies. Citing Stalin, he ignored the 
advice of his Soviet advisors, and continued to terrorize the populace. While estimates vary, the 
infamous Pul-i Charkhi prison is believed to have been the site of twenty-seven thousand 
executions between the time of the Communist takeover and the Soviet invasion, with thousands 
more killed across the country.54 The Soviet leadership became convinced that Amin was too 
extreme, and began considering a military intervention to remove him from power.  
Soviet Premier Leonid Brezhnev and members of the Politburo devised a plan to invade 
Afghanistan on December 8th, 1979. KGB agents would remove Amin, making way for Babrak 
Karmal, a member of the opposing Parchamist faction, to take over. Nine days after Brezhnev 
decided to remove Amin, the KGB attempted to poison him through a compromised cook, but 
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ultimately only poisoned members of his family. Upon learning of the KGB’s assassination 
attempt, the Soviet military voiced its opposition, saying a formidable military force would be 
necessary to back up the plot. Another attempt on Amin’s life was delayed as the Soviet military 
and political leaders debated the appropriate size of the invading force. When the chief of the 
general staff, Marshall Nikolai Ogarkov was told by Dmitry Ustinov, the Soviet Defense 
Minister, to prepare 75,000-80,000 troops for a “temporary” presence in Afghanistan, he 
vehemently opposed, saying an army of that size would be far too small to ensure stability in 
Afghanistan.55 The plan went ahead anyway. 
 
The Soviet Culminating Point: February 1980 
“One country may support another’s cause, but will never take it so seriously as it takes its 
own.”    
- Carl von Clausewitz56 
 
 Aware of the precarious position of the PDPA in Afghanistan, the Soviet Union was a 
reluctant invader. When the decision was made, however, the Soviets experienced a set of truly 
unique circumstances that allowed them to establish a military presence with little initial 
resistance. Prior to the Soviet invasion, a team of 60 Soviet officers spent several weeks in 
Afghanistan studying the Afghan army’s capabilities, the country’s terrain, and public support 
for the PDPA.57 Kabul’s prior attempts at getting Moscow to send military support gave the 
Soviet army the perfect cover to arrive, remove Amin, and firmly establish a foothold in the 
country. Under the guise of arriving to help Amin stabilize his country, the Soviet army openly 
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entered Afghanistan by land and air. Between December 25th and 27th, it had deployed forces to 
secure Afghanistan’s largest roads, cities, and towns.58  
 Given the expectation that the Soviet army was there to help Amin fight against the 
resistance, the short-term Soviet objectives – overthrowing Amin and seizing 13 key parts of 
Kabul – were relatively easily achieved. The operation to break into Amin’s palace and execute 
him took only 43 minutes, and the Soviets managed to quickly take control of the important 
media, political, and military targets across the capital with low casualties. By mid-January, the 
bulk of the Soviet 40th Army had entered Afghanistan.59 Due to the swift establishment of the 
Soviet military across Afghanistan’s major city centers and the mujahideen’s lack of 
organization and resources, February 1980 would mark the culminating point in the Soviet war 
in Afghanistan.  
81,000 Soviet soldiers would be stationed in Afghanistan by the spring of 1980, but by 
then, attacks by resistance fighters were well under way, and costly Soviet operations to gain 
territory for the DRA government would soon be planned.60 Prior to the invasion, Amin’s 
government had control of only 20% of the country.61 As Rahamim Emanuilov and Andrey 
Yashlavsky observed: “The anti-Soviet and anti-government resistance in Afghanistan was very 
heterogeneous – it included radical Islamists, monarchists, nationalists, and Maoists. Some of the 
mujahideen organizations appeared even before the Saur Revolution; others were formed during 
the civil war.”62 Throughout the USSR’s intervention, the Soviets managed to establish some 
garrisons in the rural provinces, but were unable to hold meaningful territory outside of the major 
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cities and the roads that connected them. A study of some of the 40th Army’s biggest military 
operations beyond the February 1980 culminating point supports this view. Since these 
operations were hampered by a lack of force mass and concentration – two Clausewitzian 
concepts that naturally intertwine with one another – they will be discussed in Chapter 2.  
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Historical Background to the American Culminating Point 
 After the Soviet withdrawal in 1989, the war in Afghanistan continued. The communist 
regime relied upon Soviet aid to stay afloat, using Soviet food stuffs to feed the people, weapons 
to fight the insurgents, and money to purchase the loyalty of influential commanders. The USSR 
provided approximately $300 million in aid to the DRA every month after Soviet forces 
withdrew.64 The collapse of the Soviet Union in December 1991 resulted in the loss of 
Najibullah’s only source of significant support. Boris Yeltsin, the president of the newly 
independent Russian Federation, had long argued for an end to Soviet arms supplies to 
Afghanistan, going so far as to hold talks with the mujahideen leaders. As a result, aid was 
formally cut off on January 1, 1992.65 The civil war in Afghanistan continued. 
In March 1992, Najibullah announced he would step down as part of a UN plan to 
transfer power to an interim government. Members of his administration, skeptical of the UN 
scheme, began to defect to the various insurgent factions. The new government that emerged 
after the UN plan failed was a coalition of several insurgent groups, led by Burhanuddin 
Rabbani, the leader of the Jamiat-e-Islami party. Almost immediately, factional rivalries led to 
fighting inside Kabul. While Masoud – now the defense minister of the Islamic State of 
Afghanistan – managed to remove the immediate threats to the fledgling regime, the Rabbani 
government was on weak legs from the start. The lack of institutional legitimacy, resources, and 
police power set the stage for numerous attempts to overthrow Rabbani not only by the old 
Mujahideen factions, but by new ones as well.66    
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In 1994, the Taliban formed out of individuals belonging to the Pashtun tribes of southern 
and eastern Afghanistan. The Pashtuns collectively made up roughly 40% of the total population, 
making them the country’s largest ethnic group. Despite the common background, the Pashtun 
people have had internal rivalries rooted in tribal and regional differences dating back centuries. 
After years of depraved leadership by warlords and their corrupt soldiers, many Pashtun civilians 
initially welcomed the Taliban, seeing them as a group of devoted students (Talib means 
“student” in Arabic) that formed an armed religious movement to bring back stability to the 
region.67 
The Taliban was started by Mohammed Omar. A veteran of the war to overthrow 
Najibullah, he became the mullah of Singesar, a small village in Kandahar province. When locals 
complained about an abusive commander who kidnapped and assaulted two village girls, Omar 
organized a group of armed students to execute the commander and release the victims. This act 
of vigilante justice raised Mullah Omar’s profile, and soon his team of young militants began to 
challenge the status quo in Kandahar. Seeking to stabilize Afghanistan so it could open lucrative 
trade routes to Central Asia, Pakistan was initially a benefactor of the Taliban. It provided the 
fledgling group with resources and students from its border madrassas (religious schools). After 
seizing an arms dump, the Taliban advanced on Kandahar in November 1994, capturing the 
second largest city with few casualties.68 
These initial successes spurred a feedback loop that propelled the Taliban onto the 
national scene: the more territory and weapons the Taliban captured, the more volunteers joined 
the movement, emboldening the leadership to fight more formidable warlords and expand their 
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area of control. Within three months of capturing Kandahar, 11 more provinces would be 
conquered by the Taliban.69 However, not all of these victories were a result of military prowess. 
Some provinces, such as Zabul and Uruzgan, were captured without a fight. The Taliban – which 
included plenty of seasoned war veterans among its ranks – sometimes bribed local leaders and 
frightened others into immediate surrender.70 These initial sweeping advances gave the Taliban 
an aura of invincibility that was not shattered until March 1995, when Mohammed Shah Masoud 
and his troops forced the Taliban out of southern Kabul. In the same month, Masoud would 
capitalize on the Taliban’s lack of airpower, medical resources, and disorganized structure to 
push them out of Shindand province. By May 1995, the Rabbani government regained control of 
Kabul and nearby areas as the Taliban’s territory shrunk to eight provinces.71 However, with 
support from Pakistan and the enlistment of thousands of new soldiers, the Taliban resurged.  
In September 1995, the Taliban regained Shindand and seized Herat, brutally occupying 
the western – non-Pashtun – portion of the country for the first time. Kabul, on the contrary, 
remained elusive.72 In an attempt to unite against the Taliban, President Rabbani managed to 
make peace with two of the regime’s powerful enemies: the Hezb-i-Islami faction, led by 
Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, and General Abdul Rashid Dostum, the leader of Afghanistan’s Uzbek 
population. After an unsuccessful 10-month siege of Kabul, the Taliban surprised Masoud and 
the other military factions by pivoting to an attack of Jalalabad, which was captured with few 
casualties. The offensive spread to three other eastern provinces, and in a matter of weeks, the 
Taliban opened an eastern front in the Battle for Kabul.73 The capital was finally captured in 
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September 1996. The CIA, who by this time had a limited presence in Afghanistan, had not 
expected the collapse of Kabul.74  
Fighting in the region continued, but the Taliban managed to take back territory it had 
lost along the Salang highway and push Masoud into hiding in the Panjshir Valley. Their next 
objective was to focus their military efforts on the northern provinces, the last non-Taliban 
stronghold. As of March 1997, the Taliban controlled 22 of Afghanistan’s 31 provinces.75 The 
bid to take the North was initially unsuccessful. Taliban attempts to disarm the Hazaras led to a 
revolt which precipitated a series of defeats. Dostum, with support from Russia, Uzbekistan and 
Iran, maintained control of six northern provinces, while Masoud launched a counterattack and 
once again regained the territory around Kabul.76 Thanks in part to a donation of 400 pick-up 
trucks from the Saudis and $5 million of logistical aid from Pakistan, the Taliban defeated 
Dostum’s forces and wiped out the Hazaras in August 1998.77 Two years after seizing Mazar-e-
Sharif, the last anti-Taliban stronghold of Taloqan was captured, leaving Masoud’s presence in a 
small part of the Panjshir Valley as the Taliban’s only territorial rival.78 
While the civil war in Afghanistan was fought within the country’s borders, it was not 
really an internal conflict. Over 3.8 million Afghans fled to Pakistan and Iran during the war.79 
Moreover, Afghanistan’s many neighbors expressed their own national security interests by 
propping up the factions that were ethnically and/or ideologically similar to themselves. India, 
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Iran, and the former Soviet Central Asian states supported the Rabbani government and the other 
anti-Taliban factions. Pakistan and Saudi Arabia aided the Taliban. In India’s case, the support 
for the groups opposing the Taliban was largely a result of the country’s intention to foil 
Pakistan’s plans. Russia and the Central Asian nations feared the spread of the Taliban’s Islamic 
fundamentalism to their own countries. Iran, a Shiite country, opposed the Sunni Taliban. As a 
result of its opposition to Iran, Saudi Arabia – alongside Pakistan – wanted to support its Sunni 
brethren.80 
U.S. involvement in Afghanistan during the mid-1990s was defined by a desire to stop 
the arms flow into the country and stabilize the region so lucrative gas pipelines could be 
constructed. While the U.S. opposed Iran, it did not aid any faction in the war, and instead called 
for negotiations and the shipment of humanitarian aid.81 As Taliban policies towards women and 
minorities became more public, however, the United States made its antipathy known. In 
November 1997, Secretary of State Madeleine Albright said, “'It's very clear why we're opposed 
to [the] Taliban. We're opposed to their approach to human rights, to their despicable treatment 
of women and children and their lack of respect for human dignity, in a way more reminiscent of 
the past than the future.''82  
At first, American disgust with the Taliban’s behavior did not translate into military aid 
for the anti-Taliban forces. The policy under the Clinton and pre-9/11 Bush administrations was 
to provide non-lethal aid to Masoud: night vision goggles, cameras, communications 
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equipment.83 U.S. military involvement began in August 1998, when Bin Laden’s Al Qaeda 
terrorist network bombed the U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania. The Taliban’s relationship 
with Al Qaeda was multifaceted and mutually beneficial. Some Al Qaeda soldiers were 
incorporated into the Taliban’s military, and Mullah Omar was recognized by Bin Laden and 
other Al Qaeda leaders as Commander of the Faithful (a religious term with deep historical 
meanings that signified Omar was the supreme leader of the Taliban).84 In response to the 
embassy bombings, the U.S. launched cruise missiles at Osama Bin Laden’s training camps in 
northeastern Afghanistan and demanded Bin Laden’s extradition. The Taliban denounced the 
missile assault and said they would never give him up, causing a rift not only with the United 
States, but also with Saudi Arabia, whom Bin Laden had denounced and threatened for its 
relationship with the United States. With Saudi Arabia’s support cut off, Pakistan became the 
Taliban’s only ally.85 The September 11th terrorist attacks – perpetrated by Al Qaeda – led to a 
more forceful demand for the Taliban to turn over Osama Bin Laden. When they refused, the 
U.S. and its allies commenced an invasion of Afghanistan. 
The American Culminating Point: December 2001 
“The history of military conflict in Afghanistan [has] been one of initial success, followed by long 
years of floundering and ultimate failure. We’re not going to repeat that mistake.” -  President 
George W. Bush, April 17, 2002 86 
 
 The U.S. response to the 9/11 terrorist attacks was swift. As soon as Pentagon leadership 
knew that Al Qaeda was responsible for the hijackings and the Taliban were harboring members 
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of Al Qaeda, the U.S. and its allies decided to invade Afghanistan. The initial invasion utilized 
airpower, special forces, and the Northern Alliance to systematically defeat the Taliban, leading 
to the American culminating point in December 2001, only three months after the war began. 
However, the events of the first three months also featured significant missteps, which provide 
clues as to why the culminating point did not lead to complete victory. Clausewitz’s insights on 
mass and concentration, and war aims will be used to explain the initial and long-term errors in 
Chapters 2 and 3.   
From the outset, it appeared that the Pentagon was influenced by the Soviet experience in 
Afghanistan. When CIA Director George Tenet informed President George W. Bush of the plan 
to topple the Taliban, he noted that U.S. Special Forces would play the role of the insurgents, by 
operating covertly in small numbers.87 Likewise, General Tommy Franks, one of the main war 
planners and the head of U.S. Central Command, wanted to blend U.S. and Afghan forces to 
make the invasion more palatable to the Afghan populace. The bombing campaign, which sought 
to eliminate the Taliban’s communications infrastructure and minor air-defense capabilities, 
began on October 7, 2001.88 
Since Uzbeks and Tajiks were inclined to oppose the Taliban, the land invasion began in 
the northern areas where they resided. General Dostum and Atta Mohammed, a Tajik 
commander of the Jamiat-e-Islami faction, attacked Taliban forces in the North. Mazar-e-Sharif 
and Bamiyan fell in quick succession on November 10 and 11, and Kabul was abandoned with 
no fighting on November 13. U.S. and Afghan soldiers then surrounded the city of Kunduz, 
engaging the 5,000 Taliban and Al Qaeda fighters for 12 days before taking the city. Kandahar, 
the southern stronghold of the Taliban, was captured by U.S. Special Operations Forces and 
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members of the Popalzai tribe, led by Hamid Karzai. The fight for Kandahar was more drawn out 
than the battles for other provinces, but by December 7th, Mullah Omar and the Taliban 
leadership fled, removing any semblance of Taliban control of Afghanistan.89   
90 
Figure 2: Coalition takeover of Afghanistan, 2001. 
December 2001 can be considered the culminating point for the U.S. and its coalition 
partners for a number of reasons. From a military perspective, the Taliban’s infrastructure had 
been destroyed and it marked – prior to the Taliban’s resurgence – a period during which the 
Taliban did not control or challenge any of the provinces in Afghanistan. Likewise, it was also 
before America’s botched Operation Anaconda in 2002 and the pivot to Iraq in 2003. In this 
early phase of the war, the military was focused on removing the Taliban and Al Qaeda threat; 
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there was not an expectation that it would become involved in nation-building.91 While plans for 
state-development could have built on initial military success – therefore pushing the 
culminating point further – this did not occur, and the military operations that occurred after the 
culminating point also proved less capable of attaining their objectives. As a result, December 
2001 marked the furthest point of defensible extension for the U.S. military.  
Clausewitz says there are essentially two kinds of culminating points. One occurs when 
an enemy is entirely defeated – a “culminating point of victory,” (emphasis added) – but as 
Clausewitz notes, “these are the minority.”92 The majority of culminating points of attack lead 
only to the point at which the remaining force is “just enough to maintain a defense.”93 The 
inability of the ISAF to maintain control of all provinces in Afghanistan marked an attainment of 
the latter type of culminating point in December 2001. 
 
The Counterinsurgent Acceptance Points in the Soviet and American Wars in Afghanistan 
 
 Given the analytical benefits of identifying the Soviet and American culminating points, 
it would be logical to attempt to locate culminating points for their respective enemies, the 
Mujahideen and the Taliban. However, the nature of insurgencies and guerilla warfare tactics 
does not lend itself to the concept of culminating points. In Book Seven, Chapter Five (“The 
Culminating Point of the Attack”), Clausewitz writes: “Beyond [the culminating point] the scale 
turns and the reaction follows with a force that is usually much stronger than that of the original 
attack.”94 At face value, this view is not applicable to irregular warfare. In contrast to the clear 
military objectives of conventional armies, insurgents seek to raise the enemy’s costs of 
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maintaining a military presence through many small-scale attacks over a long period of time. 
David Galula attributed this tactic to the asymmetry of the warring forces, observing the 
insurgent need to “carry the fight to a different ground where he has a better chance to balance 
the physical odds against him.”95 As a result, the uncoordinated, localized nature of guerilla 
warfare does not yield the immediate effects that one could evaluate through the lens of a 
Clausewitzian culminating point. As Mao Zedong notes: “There is in guerilla warfare no such 
thing as a decisive battle; there is nothing comparable to the fixed, passive defense that 
characterizes orthodox war.”96 Indeed, this “slow burn” / ”death by a thousand cuts” aspect of 
insurgency was identified by Gorbachev himself. In a speech to the 27th Party Congress in 1986, 
he called Afghanistan “a bleeding wound.”97 
Thus, given the unsuitability of evaluating insurgent warfare with culminating points, an 
effectually equivalent substitute is necessary. Pinpointing the moment when the insurgent’s 
enemy began to seriously consider a non-military option to ending the conflict provides the most 
appropriate antithesis to the culminating points of the Soviet and American military interventions 
in Afghanistan, and other analogous conflicts. While considering other aspects of change – such 
as shifts in public support, international disapproval, etc. – may be useful complements, they are 
difficult to gauge comparatively when one considers the unequal social and political climates of 
the Soviet Union and the United States. Furthermore, as this is a study focused on the American 
and Soviet militaries, these elements are also beyond the scope of this project.  
An identification of the point in each conflict when the counterinsurgent leadership 
realized it had to publicly consider a non-military resolution to the war – marking a crucial 
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turning point for the insurgents – is a suitable yardstick for evaluating change over time. It is 
particularly significant because, from the perspective of the insurgents, it marks the denial of a 
purely military victory for the counterinsurgents. In On War, Clausewitz portrayed war as a 
“battle of wills” between two enemies. The counterinsurgent acceptance point identifies when 
the mujahideen and the Taliban first obtained a significant victory in this figurative battle of 
opposing wills.  
In both the Soviet and American interventions in Afghanistan, it was the client regime 
who publicly announced its willingness to pursue a non-military resolution to the conflict. While 
what is crucial to the CAP concept is the underlying action (not whether the client state or 
supporting country announces it), it is noteworthy that the local governments were responsible 
for the announcements in both cases. This may be understood as a reflection of the role the client 
state plays in counterinsurgencies. As the political arm of the intervening superpower, it is 
responsible for pivoting to negotiations after assessing the failure of the superpower’s military 
means.98  
In the Soviet war in Afghanistan, the counterinsurgent acceptance point occurred in 
January 1987, when the new president of Afghanistan, Mohammad Najibullah, announced the 
National Reconciliation Policy (NRP). The initiative attempted to persuade insurgents to put 
down their arms and join the political process. In the U.S. war in Afghanistan, the 
counterinsurgent acceptance point occurred in September 2007, when then president Hamid 
Karzai publicly announced his intention to enter into peace negotiations with the Taliban for the 
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The Soviet Counterinsurgent Acceptance Point: January 1987 
“Is there the likelihood of conditions in other countries reaching the point where the cup of the 
popular patience overflows and they take to arms? Yes… The Communists support just wars of 
this kind wholeheartedly and without reservations.” - World Marxist Review, 196199 
 
The Soviets considered withdrawing from Afghanistan on numerous occasions. 
Documents from the General Staff of the Soviet Armed Forces suggest that some members of the 
military, perhaps wistfully, viewed the Karmal government to be stable enough to allow for a 
withdrawal as early as February 1980.100 Brezhnev considered the option in May 1980, and his 
successor, Yuri Andropov, did the same in the spring of 1983.101 However, these early 
discussions of a withdrawal were not indications of a desire to resolve the conflict by non-
military means. Instead, they were attempts at transferring the military burden to the Democratic 
Republic of Afghanistan (DRA). 
After conducting major operations utilizing only Soviet forces, the Soviets began to have 
tandem operations with the DRA army. An objective of the Soviet army was to build up the 
DRA forces so that they could battle the insurgents on their own. However, given the desertion 
and corruption of the Afghan army, these attempts proved futile.102 As a result, both the Soviet 
and Afghan leadership slowly abandoned the hope of resolving the conflict by military means. 
The counterinsurgent acceptance point occurred in January 1987, when the new leader of 
Afghanistan, Mohammad Najibullah, announced the National Reconciliation Policy (NRP), a 
clear attempt to end the war without more fighting.  
Mikhail Gorbachev, the Soviet leader under whom troops would ultimately withdraw, 
voiced the decision to bring the army home soon after coming to power. In October 1985, he told 
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the members of the Politburo that a decision needed to be reached on remaining in Afghanistan. 
Instead of calling for a withdrawal then, however, Gorbachev approved an 18-month escalation 
of the war as a last-ditch effort at attaining control of the country.103 This was the most deadly 
period of the war, and only after the escalation failed did the Soviet leadership begin to pursue a 
policy of withdrawal and a resolution not defined by the use of force.  
The switch to seeking a diplomatic resolution to the war was part of a comprehensive 
shift in Soviet foreign policy during the latter half of the 1980s. Dubbed the “New Thinking,” it 
was defined by a more conciliatory attitude towards adversaries, denuclearization, and a 
retraction of military support for allied nations.104 As Gorbachev would note in a speech at an 
international peace conference in 1987, the USSR now recognized the need for “lasting peace, 
predictability, and a constructive orientation in international relations.”105 While notes and 
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minutes from the Politburo sessions of 1985-1987 reveal increasing acceptance that the military 
would not be able to solve the insurgent problem, the announcement of the NRP was the 
counterinsurgent acceptance point as it marked the acquiescence of the key decision makers to 
seek a non-military solution. As William Maley notes:  
National reconciliation’ was radically inconsistent with Marxism, since it emphasised 
[sic] nations rather than classes as appropriate bases for solidarity, and cooperation rather than 
struggle as an appropriate political strategy. In this sense, it was both an aspect of ‘new 
thinking’, and part of the process of ideological dismantling that the Gorbachev era had 
inaugurated. It also reflected the failure of military force to solve the regime’s political 
problems.106 (emphasis added)   
 
Presented to the PDPA (People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan) Central Committee in 
late December 1986 and formally revealed to the Afghan public in January 1987, the NRP was 
defined by three main tenets. The first was a six month ceasefire, during which negotiations 
between the insurgents and the PDPA could begin. The second and third were contingent on the 
pause in hostilities, and they called for the creation of a forum in which all factions would be 
represented, as well as the establishment of a coalition government that would be inclusive of the 
resistance fighters.107 As Najibullah would admit in an interview 10 months after the 
announcement of the NRP, the insurgents refused to lay down their arms, rendering the policy a 
failure.108 However, its significance as a turning point remained. Despite the continuation of 
insurgent attacks, the Soviet Union – beset with many other domestic and international issues – 
no longer saw an exclusively military solution to the conflict, and refused to halt the withdrawal 
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The American Counterinsurgent Acceptance Point: September 2007 
"America is in the rare position of fighting the same war twice in one generation, from opposite 
sides. And it's easier to be the insurgents." - Bruce Riedel109 
 
 The U.S. war in Afghanistan has not been a conflict with a clear trajectory. The initial 
successes in the first few months suggested the war would be short-lived, but for reasons that 
will be considered in subsequent chapters, the tide turned against the coalition forces after 
December 2001 and resulted in the counterinsurgent acceptance point in September 2007. By 
then, the Taliban insurgency had demoralized Afghanistan’s government, leading the president, 
Hamid Karzai, to publicly announce his intention to negotiate with the Taliban for the first 
time.110  
 The Taliban and Al Qaeda fighters who escaped coalition forces in 2001 fled to 
Pakistan’s Federally Administered Tribal Areas, as well as the Baluchistan and North-West 
Frontier provinces. These secluded areas would serve as a sanctuary, recruitment, and training 
center for the Taliban and Al Qaeda.111 In August 2002, nine months after their retreat from 
Afghanistan, the Taliban began an insurgency against the Karzai government with a string of 
offensives in Kandahar and Khost provinces, among others. Between 2002 and 2007, coalition 
and Afghan forces launched multiple operations to push back against the Taliban insurgency. 
Perhaps a parallel to Gorbachev’s escalation in 1985-86, the war saw an increase in combat right 
before Karzai’s announcement.  
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Operation Mountain Thrust, begun in May 2006, was the largest offensive against the 
Taliban since the invasion. However, Mountain Thrust – as well as subsequent British operations 
in January and March 2007 – were not enough to end the insurgency.112 In fact, it appeared that 
the Taliban’s capabilities were only increasing. ISAF commander General David Richards said 
2006 was the year exploitation of Afghanistan’s developmental issues “reached a new pitch.”113 
Political scientist Seth G. Jones described the uptick in insurgent activity: 
By 2006, a full-bodied insurgency had developed in Afghanistan. The overall number of 
insurgent-initiated attacks increased by 400% from 2002 to 2006, and the number of deaths 
from these attacks increased more than 800% during the same period... The increase in 
violence was particularly acute between 2005 and 2006.114  
 
It was in this context that President Karzai announced his intention to hold talks with the 
insurgents. The Taliban spokesman Qari Mohammed Yousuf responded by saying, “[The] 
Karzai government is a dummy government. It has no authority so why should we waste our 
time and effort.”115 It was not unlike the Taliban to categorically refuse to negotiate with their 
adversaries. Throughout the Afghan civil war, there were multiple attempts by opposing factions, 
countries, and the UN to engage the Taliban in the peace process; none were successful.116 
However – barring a complete end to the conflict – the response of the insurgents to the call for 
talks is not relevant to the counterinsurgent acceptance point. (In the Soviet case, the majority of 
mujahideen also refused Najibullah’s plea to negotiate.)  
The significance of the turning point instead lies in the willingness of the 
counterinsurgent to publicly state their intentions to compromise with no guarantee the 
insurgents will respond in kind. Politically, this opens the door for hardliners to criticize the 
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current leadership and damage their image. To the public, it is a clear sign that the military has 
been unable to make substantial progress on their objectives, and does not foresee future 
progress. Given these risks, such an announcement has very large implications. While there 
would be many other calls for talks in the future (some of which even showed signs of moving 
forward) the first attempt in September 2007 signified the counterinsurgent acceptance point and 
represented a crucial change in the U.S. war in Afghanistan.       
The Significance of the Counterinsurgent Acceptance Point- Depriving the Counterinsurgent of 
the Culminating Point of Victory 
 
The CAP can be seen as a crucial milestone for the insurgents in both the Soviet and 
American wars in Afghanistan. By depriving the counterinsurgent of a military resolution to the 
conflict, the CAP is reflective of Clausewitz’s “battle of wills” concept. This is a key aspect of 
his definition of war, and an integral part of Clausewitzian theory as a whole. In Book One, 
Chapter 1, Clausewitz defines war as “an act of force to compel our enemy to do our will,” 
(emphasis added).117 While the insurgent’s ultimate “will” is to force the counterinsurgents to 
withdraw and reestablish their control over Afghanistan, compelling the adversary to publicly 
announce a willingness to negotiate signifies a departure from the planned counterinsurgent 
policy. Initially, both the Soviets and Americans renounced the notion of negotiating with the 
insurgents.  
"When we speak of destroying the enemy's forces,” wrote Clausewitz, “we must 
emphasize that nothing obliges us to limit this idea to physical forces: the moral element must 
also be considered."118 During a February 1980 meeting of the Politburo, Yuri Andropov spoke 
at length about his recent visit to Afghanistan. He emphasized the USSR’s efforts to unite the 
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Communist Party of Afghanistan and improve both the economic and security situation in the 
country.119 The Committee agreed to maintain a troop presence in the country, and Premier 
Leonid Brezhnev even stated his willingness to increase the force size.120 Significantly, the 
transcript of this early meeting reflected the outlook of the Soviet leadership; They expected to 
reconfigure Afghanistan without any negotiations with the mujahideen.  
The same outlook could be seen when President George W. Bush laid out his vision for 
Afghanistan in a speech at the Virginia Military Institute in April 2002. He spoke of the progress 
U.S. armed forces had made in routing the Taliban, as well as the humanitarian efforts underway 
to improve the conditions in the country.121 Bush noted that spring would lead to renewed 
attempts by the insurgents to retake parts of the country, but said the U.S. army would be 
“relentless” in its pursuit of the insurgents.122 “Peace will be achieved by helping Afghanistan 
develop its own stable government. Peace will be achieved by helping Afghanistan train and 
develop its own national army,” added Bush.123 Missing from his speech – and from the plans of 
the U.S. officials responsible for the war in Afghanistan – was any consideration for negotiation 
with the insurgents. Since the CAP was the first indication that the expectations of the Soviets 
and Americans had changed drastically, it signified a change in the political framework both 
counterinsurgents had initially applied to the wars in Afghanistan.  
 As Chapters 2 and 3 will demonstrate, Clausewitz’s culminating point and my 
counterinsurgent acceptance point provide an evaluative framework that standardizes and 
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enhances conflict analysis. The four points in time – February 1980, December 2001, January 
1987, September 2007 – will be used to analyze the events that led to consequential changes in 
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Chapter II 
Mass & Concentration - The Soviet and American Folly 
“As a rule, the negotiators pledge only a small and limited contingent.” - Carl Von Clausewitz124  
 
Introduction 
In Book 2, Chapter Two (“On the Theory of War”), Clausewitz explains his view of the 
origins and flaws of mainstream war theories and lays out his intentions for writing On War. 
While he acknowledges the need for a theoretical underpinning to armed conflict, he is highly 
critical of the existing literature, specifically noting its overreliance on the material factors at 
play in a conflict, as well as the lack of consideration for the less tangible characteristics that 
influence wars.125 In outlining the limitations of narrow, simplistic theories, Clausewitz lists 
“numerical superiority” as one factor that is often incorrectly “fitted into a mathematical system 
of laws.”126 He claims that this attempt to “reduce the whole secret of the art of war” yields an 
“oversimplification” at odds with “the realities of life.”127 However, Clausewitz does not dismiss 
force size as a method of evaluating warfare completely. Instead, he offers several nuanced 
principles of war that relate to army size in subsequent chapters. Although Clausewitz was 
reluctant to provide “rules” for military engagements, he nonetheless wrote qualified instructions 
throughout On War.128 The principles that relate to force mass and concentration, discussed 
below, provide important insights into the Soviet and American military failures in Afghanistan. 
In Book 3, Chapter Eight (“Superiority of Numbers”), Clausewitz describes the effect 
army mass can have on war outcomes with his classic dialectical approach. He first argues that if 
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all other factors – geography, fighting skill, resources, etc. – are removed from consideration, the 
number of soldiers an army possesses “will determine victory.”129 Conversely, given the 
multitude of circumstances and elements at play in actual engagements, larger force size could 
end up contributing “very little” to military success.130 Clausewitz notes that increases in army 
mass can make up for other weaknesses and serve as a “counterbalance to all other contributing 
circumstances,” but he does not present this as a principle of war. In some scenarios, he says, 
even massive force disparities can prove ineffective. He offers a hypothetical “mountain pass, 
where even a tenfold superiority would not be sufficient.”131 For Clausewitz, these geographic 
traps are not true military engagements, and thus lie outside of the scope of his analysis.  
In regard to military operations, however, Clausewitz clearly advocates for the use of the 
largest possible force, concentrated at what he calls the “vital” or “decisive” point.132 
Significantly, he does not define what this point is, only commenting that success depends on 
“the correct appraisal of this decisive point.”133 This idea is reiterated in Chapter 3 of Book 5 
(“Relative Strength”), and Chapter 11 of Book 3 (“Concentration of Forces in Space”), where he 
writes that “there is no higher and simpler law of strategy than that of keeping one’s forces 
concentrated (emphasis in original).”134 Evaluating the manifestation of conflict as a realist, 
however, Clausewitz stresses the variance in outcome and – in Book 1, Chapter 1 (“What is 
War?”) – underscores that “the very nature of war impedes the simultaneous concentration of all 
forces (emphasis in original).”135Yet, according to Clausewitz, this is a principle that should be 
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regarded “as a reliable guide” in military decision making.136 This chapter will analyze the 
factors that prevented an appropriate concentration of Soviet and U.S. forces in Afghanistan.  
The language in On War suggests that the decisive point was understood by Clausewitz 
to be both temporal and geographic. In Chapter 11, Book 3, he writes of the preferred physical 
state of the army: “No force should ever be detached from the main body unless the need is 
definite and urgent.”137 This idea can also be seen in Chapter 8, Book 3, where Clausewitz 
asserts the need for “courage to retain the major part of one’s forces united,” so “relative 
superiority is attained at the decisive point.”138 The “calculation of space and time” is “the most 
essential factor (emphasis added)” in utilizing mass to achieve military success.139  
In this chapter, I will address the following questions: 
1. In the wars in Afghanistan, what were the “decisive points” at which 
Clausewitzian theory argues for a concentration of the greatest possible mass?  
2. Did the respective militaries properly appraise these points? Why were the Soviet 
and ISAF forces unable to concentrate mass at the decisive point?  
I will argue that – while there have been many “decisive points” throughout both wars in 
Afghanistan – the moment at which the tide of war could have been turned against the insurgents 
were the culminating points for both conflicts: February 1980 and December 2001. In both 
instances, political interference and military miscalculation led to an incorrect appraisal of the 
decisive point. Throughout the Soviet and American wars in Afghanistan, military officials, 
diplomats, and scholars debated and continue to debate the number of troops necessary to 
overwhelm the insurgents. While commenting on a particular force size requires more research 
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and specialized knowledge and is outside of the scope of this study, I will argue that 
Clausewitzian mass and concentration theory lends support to those who called for a far greater 
troop presence in Afghanistan at the outsets of both conflicts.  
 Furthermore, whereas traditional theorists have undervalued the effect of an insurgent 
sanctuary, more recent scholarship has persuasively argued that – while there are many factors 
that contribute to the success of insurgencies in Afghanistan – the Pakistan safe haven has been 
the key reason for the resilience of the mujahideen during the 1980s and the Taliban today. An 
evaluation of the number of insurgents between the culminating point and the counterinsurgent 
acceptance point, paired with Clausewitz’s observations on force size, will more clearly delineate 
the connection between Pakistan’s support for the insurgents and their success.  
The Culminating Point as the Decisive Point for Force Concentration 
 While Clausewitz never mentioned the congruency between the “decisive point” and the 
“culminating point,” it appears they can align with one another. Both points refer to an optimal 
moment in which resources and manpower are situated appropriately to provide the best 
opportunity for achieving the military objective. As I discussed earlier, Clausewitz described two 
different culminating points: one in which the military offensive reaches its farthest point of 
defensible extension, and one that leads to outright victory. His descriptions of the “decisive 
point” suggest that – if the attacking side was able deploy the appropriate amount of mass and 
concentration during an offensive that was culminating – it would lead to a culminating point of 
victory.  
 This is not to say that either the United States or the Soviet Union would have been able 
to defeat their adversaries at their respective culminating points had there been more troops at 
critical parts of the country. As anyone who is familiar with Clausewitz’s theories would admit, 
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military success requires a plethora of factors – including ephemeral ones such as luck and 
weather conditions – coalescing to provide the decisive advantage for one side. Likewise, given 
the nature of insurgencies, there may be an appearance of stability and peace while an 
underground resistance movement reorganizes, recruits, and plans new offensives. 
However, because the culminating point occurred in both conflicts as they transitioned 
from conventional military operations to counterinsurgencies, it presented the best opportunity to 
weaken the oncoming uprising. There were senior officials in both countries who unsuccessfully 
advocated for a Clausewitzian force doctrine: Chief of the Soviet General Staff Nikolai Ogarkov, 
and Secretary of State Colin Powell. While they adopted different strategic and tactical methods 
of waging war, both the Americans and the Soviets increased their force size after the insurgents 
escalated the conflict. This is in contrast to Clausewitz’s theory of war, which supports a 
formidable, preemptive force concentration that is ready for an escalation of violence.  
In the section of this chapter that discusses the Soviet war in Afghanistan, I will show 
how U.S. aid to the insurgency, Soviet force size, and the number of mujahideen between 1980 
and 1987 illustrate how the culminating point was also the decisive point at which more troops 
were necessary. In the section of this chapter that discusses the U.S. war in Afghanistan, I will 
explain how U.S. force size and average strength, the increase in insurgent attacks, and the rise in 
the number of insurgents support this view as well. While it would have been ideal to select the 
same factors to evaluate in both conflicts, the variations in available, reliable information led me 
to choose different measurements of Soviet and American military failure. Nonetheless, the 
different statistics are all reflective of two, similar doctrines that only committed more forces 
after experiencing significant setbacks.   
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Soviet Lack of Mass & Concentration 
“Massive troop reinforcement...might drastically reduce the insurgency in the next two years.” - 
CIA Assessment, September 14, 1983140 
 
Foreign Aid to the Mujahideen 
The day after the Soviets invaded Afghanistan, President Carter received a classified 
memorandum on the matter from Zbigniew Brzezinski, his National Security Advisor. Under a 
section titled “What is to be Done?” Brzezinski wrote: “It is essential that Afghanistani 
resistance continues. This means more money as well as arms shipments to the rebels.”141 Prior 
to the invasion, Carter had already approved approximately half a million dollars in non-lethal 
aid to the anticommunist resistance fighters in Afghanistan.142 The military intervention would 
spur a massive aid increase that would last longer than the Soviet presence in Afghanistan. In 
1980, $30 million of cash, weapons, and other aid was supplied to the mujahideen.143 By 1987, 
the aid amount from the United States had increased to approximately $630 million (see Figure 
1).144 Additionally, while the U.S. played the central role in facilitating arms and money transfers 
to the mujahideen through Pakistan, China, England, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and others were 
financially involved as well.145 The Saudi royal family, encouraged by their own Islamist beliefs 
and fearing the Soviets could take their oil fields next, agreed to match U.S. aid to the 
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mujahideen dollar-for-dollar, a promise they kept even when U.S. support reached hundreds of 
millions of dollars per year.146  
 
 
Figure 1: U.S. Aid to the Mujahideen, 1980-1987. U.S. aid was matched dollar-for-dollar by 
Saudi Arabia, while some wealthy individuals, organizations, and other nations contributed 
smaller amounts throughout the conflict.147 
 
While it is true that the USSR could not have known the extent to which the U.S. and 
other nations would support the resistance movement, the KGB knew the mujahideen were 
receiving foreign assistance long before the Politburo considered intervention. In March 1979 – 
nine months before the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan – the Soviet Ambassador to Hungary 
told a Hungarian party member that the Afghan insurgents were receiving foreign assistance: 
“Recently the Afghan reactionary forces have organized armed actions with foreign support… 
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counter-revolutionary reactions have become stronger, [and] are actively supported and helped 
by the special services of imperialist powers like China, Pakistan and Iran.”148 After the invasion, 
– and due in large part to an extraordinary lobbying effort by Texas Congressman Charlie 
Wilson – the CIA launched Operation Cyclone, a clandestine effort that fueled the insurgency 
against the Soviets by indirectly providing arms, money, and training to the anticommunist 
fighters.  
Congressman Wilson’s lobbying campaign would lead to the transfer of Stinger missiles 
to the mujahideen in 1986. The Stingers were a surface-to-air missile the resistance fighters had 
long sought for their ability to destroy Soviet aircraft.149 While the Soviets may have not 
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expected that foreign nations would provide weapons of this sophistication, Soviet intelligence 
were aware of the influx of arms that would occur because of foreign support. In fact, they used 
this information to threaten an increase in their force presence in Afghanistan. In July 1981, a 
KGB agent met with Pakistan’s Chargé d'Affaires and warned him that the Soviet Union would 
increase its troop presence if Pakistan continued to arm the insurgents:  
In a confidential conversation, he passed on the views of the competent agencies… 
Particular emphasis was given to the theme that the US assisted the Afghan rebels with arms 
sent through Pakistan; these arms were used not only to kill Afghans but also to kill Soviet 
citizens; the USSR would be forced, not to reduce, but instead to increase the scale of its 
military assistance… the Soviet side would be unable to stand by idly in the face of such 
developments.150  
 
 Despite these direct threats, however, the Soviets proved unwilling to substantially 
increase their force deployment, thereby debilitating their capabilities as support for the 
mujahideen drastically increased. In contrast to the Clausewitzian understanding of mass and 
concentration, an evaluation of Soviet force size shows how there were only marginal force 
increases which occurred after the insurgents escalated their attacks.   
Size of the Armed Forces 
The Soviet Union underestimated the number of troops it would take to prop up the 
communist regime in Afghanistan. Entering the country with an initial contingent of 50,000, the 
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Soviet 40th Army kept the force size at around 80,000-100,000 troops during the years the 
insurgency was being bolstered by foreign aid and training.151 Likewise, from 1980-1983, the 
USSR maintained a defensive posture around the main cities and roads, actively avoiding direct 
confrontation with the mujahideen.152 During this period in the war, the grossly unprepared DRA 
Army was expected to handle the insurgents.153 However, as an analysis of major 
counterinsurgent Soviet operations will show, Soviet force size was insufficient to defeat the 
insurgents even when the 40th army adopted an aggressive counterinsurgent effort and took on 
the bulk of the fighting.  
Despite attempts to train and equip the Afghan army, it proved incapable of being an 
effective fighting force on its own. A CIA Assessment from September 1986 described the DRA 
Army as “under-manned, demoralized, faction-ridden, and ill-equipped. [They] remain unable to 
undertake large-scale operations on their own.”154 Initially, the Soviet military leadership 
expected the DRA Army to fight the mujahideen in the rural areas, while the Soviets guarded the 
cities and roads. They quickly realized, however, that the Afghan army was too small and 
incapable of making significant progress against the insurgents.155 Due to desertion, the size of 
the Afghan Army declined from its pre-revolution level of 110,000 to only 25,000 troops by 
1980.156 To bring up the numbers, the Soviets adopted a controversial policy of encircling 
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villages and forcibly conscripting young Afghan men. With the exception of the Afghan special 
forces – known as KhAD- the Afghan soldiers were generally reluctant to fight the mujahideen, 
and often switched sides, their Soviet weapons in tow.157 In 1988, with Soviet forces beginning 
to withdraw, the DRA Army had a reported 150,000 troops.158 But Lester Grau and Michael 
Gress, editors of the official account of the war written by the Russian General Staff, assert that 
Soviet reports of DRA strength were overestimations, since tribal militias would inflate their 
numbers to increase the amount of Soviet aid they received.159  
An unreliable Afghan army left more of the warfighting burden on the Soviets, who 
themselves struggled with deploying enough troops to combat the insurgents. Most anti-
mujahideen operations consisted of only 10,000-15,000 personnel.160 Of the Soviet troops 
stationed in Afghanistan, only a portion of them were available for combat operations. “Of the 
133 battalions in the 40th Army,” writes Rodric Braithwaite, “only 51 took part regularly in 
operations. The rest spent much of their time in their garrisons or escorting convoys.”161 The 
battalions that participated in operations were incapable of holding territory they took from the 
rebels. One Soviet commander’s lament explained the repercussions of a small force size: 
Throughout the whole of that war practically every operation ended in the same way. 
Military operations began, soldiers and officers died, Afghan soldiers died, the mujahedin and 
the peaceful population died, and when the operation was over our forces would leave, and 
everything would return to what it had been before.162   
In the numerous Soviet-led operations in Zhawar and the Panjshir Valley, for example, 
the Soviets were unable to consolidate their victories in large part because of their inadequate 
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force size. While the insurgents would evade head-on firefights and willingly cede territory with 
the intention of regaining it after the Soviets withdrew from the region, the inability to leave a 
sizable contingent in the area made this tactic easier to implement. Instead of invading the rebel-
held territories initially with overwhelming force, the Soviets adopted a policy of escalation, with 
each attempt featuring greater troops and weaponry. The Panjshir operations exemplify the flaws 
of this approach. 
The first Soviet invasion of the Panjshir Valley came four months after the Soviet arrival 
in Afghanistan. At this point, the mujahideen were not expecting an invasion of the valley, so the 
Soviets did not experience much resistance. They established the Rukha district center, but had 
to deploy troops to Rukha three times in the next nine months to defend it against attacks. The 
insurgency ultimately proved unmanageable, and a rescue operation evacuated the garrison, 
leaving the Panjshir Valley under rebel control.163 In May 1982, the Soviets once again tried to 
invade Panjshir in a major, multi-phased operation. They established six garrisons and many 
outposts, but as with the first attempt at clearing the territory, the withdrawal of most armed 
forces led to increased attacks as the mujahideen returned. In January 1983, the leader of the 
Panjshir resistance fighters, Ahmad Shah Masoud, negotiated a one-year ceasefire agreement 
with the Soviets. Per the terms of the truce, the Soviets evacuated all but one of their garrisons in 
the Valley. The temporary peace allowed Massoud to rebuild his forces and prepare for the next 
Soviet offensive, which occurred in April 1984.164 
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The 1984 operation to retake the Panjshir Valley involved 200 aircraft, 190 helicopters, 
and up to 16,000 Soviet and DRA troops. In the end, the Soviets regained control of five out of 
the six previously held main garrisons and once again established outposts throughout the region. 
While this was hailed as a great victory for the Soviet Union and the DRA, the mujahideen 
continued to attack the garrisons until the Soviet withdrawal.165 Reflecting the situation in many 
of the rural provinces, the Soviets incurred high costs with each attempt at seizing control over 
the Panjshir Valley, did not achieve any strategic advantages, and had to repeatedly send in 
troops to reinforce the forts against rebel attacks, all signs of military operations that went past 
the culminating point, and an escalatory policy that could not succeed because of insufficient 
force mass.  
The ineffectiveness of the seven military operations into the Panjshir Valley was also 
illustrated by the growing number of insurgents in the area. Led by “The Lion of the Panjshir” 
Ahmad Shah Masood, there were approximately 1,000 resistance fighters in 1980, 5,000 in 1984, 
and as many as 13,000 in 1989.166 Evidently, the garrisons and guard posts in enemy territory did 
not help to free the area of mujahideen control. The smaller guard posts, called zastavas, dotted 
the Afghan landscape, with some located in areas so inaccessible that they were supplied solely 
by helicopter. 862 in total, they were manned by approximately 20,000 Soviet soldiers, and were 
tasked with being the eyes and ears of the armed forces. While some developed working 
relationships with the nearby villages, they were often attacked by the mujahideen.167     
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Another example of Soviet military expeditions that failed because of an inability to hold 
conquered territory can be found in the multiple operations to seize Zhawar, a mountain canyon 
in Khost province, located approximately two and a half miles from the Pakistan border. Seen as 
an important base camp and staging area for the insurgents, Zhawar was one of the main targets 
for the joint Soviet and DRA offensives of 1985 and 1986.168 The first attempt at seizing Zhawar 
was foiled when mujahideen reinforcements overwhelmed the counterinsurgents as they got 
close to the base. The second was successful in seizing the base, which consisted of a vast 
network of 41 caves that featured a mosque, hospital, hotel, bakery, library, and stockpiles of 
arms, ammunition, and mines, but did not lead to permanent control of the territory. Fearing a 
counterattack was imminent, the Soviet and Afghan troops held Zhawar for a total of five hours, 
during which they unsuccessfully attempted to blow up the caves. The Soviet and DRA casualty 
count is unknown, but the insurgents captured 530 men from the 38th commando brigade and 
executed all the officers, offering amnesty to the soldiers after two years of labor. Having shot 
down 24 helicopters and two jets during the battle, the mujahideen retook Zhawar and nearby 
territory.169 Just like the Panjshir offensives, the Soviets were unable to hold any territory or gain 
a strategic advantage from temporarily seizing the Zhawar base. 
The vast majority of the territory the Soviet army held in February 1980 (the Culminating 
Point) was not reclaimed by the mujahideen at any point during the war.170 In contrast to the 
villages that were won and lost or destroyed, the major cities occupied during the culminating 
point withstood attacks by the insurgents and were passed onto the DRA government during the 
Soviet withdrawal. The Soviet operations after February 1980, on the other hand, surpassed the 
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culminating point because Soviet and DRA counterinsurgent force size and capabilities were 
inadequate for holding territory outside the urban areas.  
 
 
Figure 2: Soviet Armed Forces Deployed in Afghanistan, 1979-1987. The 1985-1986 troop surge 
has been credited by some scholars to Gorbachev, who allegedly gave the Soviet generals one 
last chance to solve the problem by military means. There was also a 15,000 force drawdown in 
late 1986, followed by a two-stage withdrawal of the entire Soviet army. The last Sovier soldier 
departed Afghanistan in 1989.171  
Growth of the Insurgency and its Capabilities 
The number of insurgents that fought the Soviets between 1980 and 1987 has never been 
determined, and estimates vary widely. In reporting the number of mujahideen that were killed 
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during combat, the Soviets infamously utilized an unreliable formula that factored in the number 
of bullets they expended during battle.172 The Russian General Staff claimed the number of 
insurgents tripled between 1983 and 1985.173 Post-war scholarship has placed the number of 
mujahideen at anywhere between 35,000 and 250,000 at different points in the conflict.174 
However, the historical record indicates that the number of fighters grew substantially over time, 
a trend that was predicted by some members of the Soviet leadership, but was ultimately ignored 
when the Politburo crafted its military policy.  
 As international aid increased, thousands of young Afghan men were trained in Pakistan 
and Afghanistan. This provided the insurgency with the manpower it needed to challenge the 
Soviets with increasing aggression. In 1983, there were two training camps in Pakistan that each 
prepared 200 people per month. By 1987, there were seven facilities and approximately 20,000 
trainees per year.175 An April 1988 CIA analysis estimated the number of insurgents at 
approximately 350,000, noting that only half were “professional” fighters “whose main function 
is conducting guerilla operations,” while many others split their time between fighting the 
Soviets and engaging in civilian occupations, such as farming.176 Under a section titled, 
“Implications for Regime Counterinsurgency,” the report also noted:   
Most specialists in counterinsurgency maintain that the government must have a 10-to-
1 ratio in its favor in order to protect the cities and economic infrastructure and make progress 
against insurgents in their base camps. Kabul’s forces almost certainly cannot match guerilla 
manpower, which bodes ill for the regime’s counterinsurgency effort.177 
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 In addition to the growth of foreign aid and the increase in their ranks, the mujahideen 
received guidance on their military objectives from Pakistan. Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) – 
Pakistan’s chief intelligence agency – used its power to disperse arms to also ensure the 
mujahideen were maximizing their capabilities. Mohammad Yousaf, ISI’s head of the Afghan 
Bureau from 1983-87 wrote in his memoir: “I had to coordinate attacks on strategic targets and 
maintain the initiative over an area of 260,000 square miles… The only way I could influence 
the [mujahideen], get them moving in the right direction, was through the allocation and 
withholding of supplies and training.”178 This disciplinary approach further enhanced insurgent 
capabilities. Had the Soviet leadership adopted the views of Marshal Nikolai Ogarkov, the Chief 
of the General Staff of the USSR from 1977-1984, they would have been better positioned to 
address the threat posed by the insurgency in Afghanistan. 
Failure to Adopt The Ogarkov Doctrine 
Marshal Nikolai Ogarkov rose through the ranks of the Soviet military at an 
unprecedented pace and became one of the country’s leading military thinkers. In the 1970s, he 
developed “The Grand Strategy,” a plan for overtaking Western Europe without using any 
nuclear weapons on the continent.179 He viewed the swift use of conventional forces, paired with 
a modernized army and command structure, as the future of armed conflict. Throughout his 
career, Ogarkov developed many military exercises that emphasized speed and “intended to 
restore the land battlefield as the prime form of warfare.”180 Despite Marshal Ogarkov’s renown, 
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he was unable to convince the political leadership of the USSR that the war in Afghanistan 
would require far more troops than they were willing to commit. 
In two meetings held on December 10th, 1979 – just 15 days before the Soviet invasion – 
Marshal Ogarkov voiced his opposition to military intervention. He first objected on the grounds 
of the political repercussions invading an Islamic country would have on the region and the 
world stage. Yuriy Andropov, with the approval of Brezhnev and other senior Party members, 
responded by telling Ogarkov to “stick to military affairs.”181 Later that day, Ogarkov was 
ordered to organize a 75-80,000 person troop deployment to Afghanistan. He again objected, 
saying that the force was not large enough to fulfill the mission.182 In 1982, he published Always 
in Defense of the Motherland, a military operations book that considered the options the Soviet 
Union would have in an armed conflict with the United States.183 While he did not directly 
address Afghanistan in the text, Ogarkov went against the Soviet status quo in proclaiming the 
importance of ground troops by saying that they were “in essence, the basic branch of our Armed 
Forces.”184 For him, the future of war with the United States would be defined by a protracted, 
regional, non-nuclear military engagement.185 Despite these views, on December 24th, 1979, 
Marshal Ogarkov joined the Soviet Defense Minister Dmitry Ustinov in signing a directive to 
provide “international aid to the friendly Afghan people and also to create favorable conditions 
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to interdict possible anti-Afghan actions from neighboring countries,” thereby authorizing the 
use of force in Afghanistan.186  
The effects of introducing a relatively small contingent of troops for a strictly limited 
engagement were felt immediately. After securing the main roads and city centers, the Soviets 
were reluctant to commence any operations against the mujahideen, despite pleas from Afghan 
President Babrak Karmal. The Soviet military leadership “argued that they did not envision 
participation of the units and formations introduced into Afghanistan in combat activities in the 
DRA territory. [The troops] could only respond if forced to do so under immediate fire impact on 
the rebels, or undertake operations for the liberation of our military advisers.”187 When the 
decision to engage the mujahideen throughout the country was made, the Soviets lack of mass 
and concentration hampered their ability to combat the insurgents.  
U.S. Lack of Mass & Concentration 
“The light footprint translated into one of the lowest levels of troops, police, and financial 
assistance in any stabilization operation since the end of World War II.” - Seth G. Jones188 
 
 In terms of a Clausewitzian understanding of mass and concentration, the U.S. war in 
Afghanistan has significant parallels to the Soviet war. Ironically, some of these similarities 
came about as a result of attempts by U.S. officials to wage war differently from the Soviets. 
Like the USSR, however, the U.S. assessed the need for greater force size too far past the 
culminating point. December 2001 was not only the moment at which the Taliban was most 
decimated and disorganized, it was also the decisive point at which a concentration of forces 
could have prevented the then fledgling insurgency movement from becoming a formidable 
adversary. An analysis of troop deployments, violence levels, and estimates of insurgent force 
size reveal how the decisive point was missed, and a study of the decisions leading up to the war 
in Iraq explains why.  
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The Culminating Point as a Decisive Point for Force Concentration 
 Temporally, the culminating point may have been the decisive point at which America 
had the best chance at winning the war in Afghanistan, but a number of missteps related to mass 
and concentration caused a widespread insurgency that led to the Counterinsurgent Acceptance 
Point in 2007. Geographically, the concentration of U.S. and allied security forces was not near 
the south and east, where the Pashtun population that the Taliban arose from resides, or along the 
porous border with Pakistan, through which Taliban members could flee, reorganize, and recruit 
new members. Instead, the U.S. government was in disagreement over whether any troops 
should be sent to assist the interim Afghan government with its security concerns.  
During a December 2001 conversation, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld and 
President Bush’s special envoy to the Northern Alliance James Dobbins discussed the amount of 
troops they believed would be necessary to secure Afghanistan’s largest cities. Dobbins believed 
only 25,000 would be enough.189 Venturing beyond the cities was not considered, as there was 
opposition to expanding the peacekeeping operation outside of Kabul. Secretary of State Colin 
Powell supported a larger deployment – a key aspect of the Powell Doctrine –  while Secretary 
of Defense Donald Rumsfeld advocated for the minimalist “light footprint” approach, which was 
ultimately implemented.190 The error of not concentrating a sizable troop contingent in 
Afghanistan’s problem areas would reveal itself in the months and years after the December 
2001 culminating point. In January 2007, just 8 months before President Karzai would announce 
his intention to seek peace talks with the Taliban (the Counterinsurgent Acceptance Point), the 
senior U.S. military official in Afghanistan Lt. General Karl Eikenberry would call for a larger 
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deployment of U.S. troops in response to the Taliban’s resurgence.191 This plea was indicative of 
a flawed military policy that escalated its resources only in response to a heightened threat level. 
In contrast, Clausewitz’s concept of “decisive force,” – unsuccessfully advocated for by 
Secretary of State Colin Powell – called for a larger troop presence at the outset of the conflict.    
 
Force Mass 
“By the winter of 2002-3 there was no longer any question that the Taliban had re-formed.” - 
Gilles Dorronsoro192 
 
In November 2001, after the initial combat operations against the Taliban were largely 
complete, about 1,000 U.S. troops remained on the ground.193 The “light footprint” model, 
adopted in 2002, provided significantly fewer forces than would have been necessary to ensure a 
stable Afghanistan. A study of troop levels by the Congressional Research Service (CRS) 
detailed the changes in force size from 2001 to 2007. In terms of troops stationed in Afghanistan, 
the number of soldiers increased by approximately 10,800 troops from FY2002 to FY2005.194 
However, deployments lagged behind increases in the insurgents’ capabilities. The Taliban were 
initially emboldened by the lack of a U.S. troop presence in some districts, as requests by the 
Karzai administration and the U.N. for force increases were not implemented for months.195 As 
Seth G. Jones explained: 
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Low troop levels made it extremely difficult to establish law and order throughout the 
country. And there was almost no chance to revisit that decision. Once the United States began 
planning the war in Iraq, the light foot-print plan was virtually impossible to alter; the United 
States could not deploy additional forces to Afghanistan because they were committed 
elsewhere...U.S. and NATO forces could clear territory occupied by Taliban or other insurgent 
groups but could not hold it.196  
In the fall of 2003, the U.S. supported the transfer of ISAF control to NATO, after which 
Provincial Reconstruction Teams were formed to coordinate humanitarian relief with the 
military’s COIN operations.197 Meanwhile, alongside the insufficient force deployed by the U.S. 
and international community, a fledgling Afghan army of 6,000 had been put together. Plagued 
with ethnic divisions and desertions, it was unable to assist the U.S. and ISAF forces in their 
military objectives.198 
In 2006, with the onset of greater insurgent attacks, there was a deployment of 
approximately 2,600 additional troops (see Figure 3), and a greater portion were stationed in 
combat zones.199 This is indicative of the responsive – not preemptive – nature of U.S. force 
deployment that was ultimately unable to make up for the initial strength deficiency. Beyond 
soldiers on the ground, the drastic change in the “average strength” – the number of assisting 
personnel stationed on Navy ships and in neighboring countries – also illustrates the lack of 
force. In FY2002, there were approximately 83,400 personnel taking part in Operation Enduring 
Freedom (OEF). The following two fiscal years, however, had 74% fewer individuals involved 
in the mission. Despite yearly increases to the average strength, by FY2007 the total force was 
approximately 31,300, a far cry from the FY2002 amount (see Figure 4).200  
 
196 Jones, Graveyard of Empires, 115.  
197 Dorronsoro, Revolution Unending, 340-342. 
198 Ibid., 337-340. Barnett R. Rubin, Afghanistan From the Cold War Through the War on Terror, (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 2013), 423.  
199 Amy Belasco, Troop Levels in the Afghan and Iraq Wars, FY2001-FY2012: Cost and Other Potential 
Issues, (Congressional Research Service, July 2, 2009), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R40682.pdf.  
200 Ibid. 
  61 
It was not until 2009 that the U.S. surged its troop presence in Afghanistan, increasing its 
force size from roughly 30,000 to 60,000 troops.201 In an effort by President Obama to finish the 
war, peak troop commitment was reached in 2011 with over 100,000 soldiers.202 Conversely, 
between 2002 and 2006, while the Taliban – as well as Al Qaeda and its affiliates – were 
regrouping, the U.S. underestimated the threat level and focused its troops and resources on the 
war in Iraq. Military personnel and assets were diverted to plan and execute the invasion of Iraq 
as early as November 2001, even before the Taliban was removed from power in Afghanistan.203 
As a result, the peak security presence in the first two years of the war in Afghanistan for every 
thousand inhabitants was below U.S. operations in the Balkans, Iraq, and Haiti, among others.204  
The demotion of the war in Afghanistan from being a top priority was evident in multiple 
facets of Operation Enduring Freedom beyond force size. U.S. financial assistance fell below 
pledged amounts, and even declined as the security situation worsened in 2005-6.205 In terms of 
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) assets, U.S. forces in Afghanistan received 
one or two assets – such as Predator drones or reconnaissance planes – for every four or five that 
were sent to Iraq.206 Likewise, Special Operations forces were moved from Afghanistan to Iraq, 
and Afghan National Army soldiers had to be trained by National Guard troops, while the 
preferred active duty soldiers were sent to Iraq.207 As a result, between the Culminating Point 
and the Counterinsurgent Acceptance Point the insurgency was able to grow with significantly 
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less obstacles than could have been implemented. The data on insurgent violence in Afghanistan 
during this time supports this view.       
 
 
Figure 4: Average monthly troop levels, U.S. war in Afghanistan, FY 2002-2008. The increase in 
force size was responsive to an escalation in insurgent violence.208  
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Figure 5: Average monthly troop strength, U.S. war in Afghanistan, FY 2002-2008. Average 
strength is a force measurement tool that includes “all military personnel providing theater 
support in the region, reflect the time personnel are deployed, and capture those present 
throughout the month.”209 
 
The Growth of the Insurgency 
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Figure 6: The Growth of the Insurgency. Between the Culminating Point and the 
Counterinsurgent Acceptance Point, the number and severity of insurgent attacks increased 
significantly. The force response was delayed and insufficient.210  
 
The 2001 Bonn Agreement established the International Security Assistance Force 
(ISAF). The NATO-led international mission initially consisted of a 5,000 troop contingent 
limited to Kabul and nearby areas, but was expanded over time to encompass the whole 
country.211 While U.S. forces – which made up the bulk of the ISAF presence in Afghanistan 
– were incrementally enlarged, the insurgency grew drastically. Until 2006, the insurgency’s 
territorial growth was tracked by the U.S. government at the district level, but the maps have not 
been declassified.212 However, the increase in violence that came with the Taliban’s resurgence 
was tracked by the media and NGOs. As early as 2002, the Logar and Wardak provinces were 
threatened by members of the Taliban.213  
Heightened levels of violence demonstrated the need for larger initial force deployment. 
Between 2002 and 2005, the number and severity of insurgent attacks more than quadrupled (see 
Figure 6). 2006, in particular, witnessed an unprecedented increase in violence as the Taliban 
grew in strength and capability. Statistics released by the U.S. military showed a more than 
200% increase in bomb attacks and a five-fold increase in suicide attacks.214 On September 8th, 
2006, a suicide bomb detonation outside of the U.S. embassy in Kabul left 16 people dead, the 
most fatal assault up until that point since the 2001 invasion.215 Overall, 2006 was the deadliest 
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year the country experienced since the arrival of U.S. forces.216 Yet, the force size response was 
not commensurate with the Taliban’s resurgence. In 2005 and 2006, the U.S. troop presence 
grew by only several thousand. By 2008, it was at approximately 30,000, less than a third of the 
eventual peak level in 2011 (see Figure 4).217 While U.S. commanders requested more soldiers 
and politicians struggled with how to justify sending more troops to the public, the insurgency 
continued to grow.   
 
Insurgent Force Size  
 
As with the mujahideen during the Soviet war in Afghanistan, verified and complete 
force size estimates are unavailable. Given the nature of insurgency warfare, many combatants 
are involved in the war effort part-time. Due to the climate in Afghanistan, insurgents also tend 
to launch offensives during the spring and summer months, making yearly calculations 
difficult.218 Furthermore, size estimates may not be a good indicator of the strength of an 
insurgency on their own. The asymmetric dynamic of guerilla warfare allows for a very small 
insurgent force to have a devastating effects on the counterinsurgents. But while it is less 
relevant than the number of U.S. troops deployed to Afghanistan, the amount of insurgents 
remains a useful gauge of the popularity and capability of the insurgency over time. Despite the 
lack of consensus on the Taliban’s size, multiple sources indicate that between 2002 and 2007 – 
along with the heightened violence – the number of insurgents grew. While a thorough analysis 
of the reasons for this growth is beyond the scope of this study, it is well known that the 
Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), which border Afghanistan on the Pakistan side, 
became a sanctuary and recruitment area for the Taliban after the U.S. invasion.219 A 2009 
intelligence report said the Taliban had grown four-fold.220 A 2008 estimate placed the total 
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number of insurgents at 7,000-11,000.221 Their revenues, meanwhile, had expanded with the 
opium trade.222 Failure to provide an adequate force size contributed to the prevention of an early 
containment of the insurgency, and may have contributed to the Taliban’s resurgence.  
The Powell Doctrine 
While there are many factors that affect military outcomes, the doctrinal approach that is 
initially applied to a war effort is instrumental in laying the groundwork for military success or 
failure. The Clausewitzian approach to armed intervention emphasizes a concentrated, decisive 
force size. Colin Powell’s intervention framework advocated for this approach, but it was not 
adopted. Consisting of a five-pronged analysis that calls for military intervention only if all five 
standards are met, Colin Powell derived his force intervention framework from that of his mentor 
and boss, former Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger. In essence, the Powell Doctrine 
considered military involvement in a foreign country as justified if it (1) involved a crucial 
national interest, (2) all other non-military avenues failed, (3) the planned use of force was 
decisive/overwhelming, (4) there was a well defined exit strategy, and (5) the intervention had 
international and public support.223 Throughout his lengthy military and diplomatic career, 
Powell attempted to apply it to intervention decisions, and only achieved partial success in 
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shaping intervention policy. His opposition to limited force deployments was evident in a 1992 
Foreign Affairs article on the post-Cold War military policy of the U.S.:  
We should always be skeptical when so-called experts suggest that all a particular crisis calls for 
is a little surgical bombing or a limited attack. When the "surgery" is over and the desired result 
is not obtained, a new set of experts then comes forward with talk of just a little escalation—
more bombs, more men and women, more force. History has not been kind to this approach to 
warmaking.224      
 
Clausewitz’s influence on the Powell Doctrine is clearly evident in Powell’s descriptions 
of his own views. Asked in a 2001 interview about his support for the use of overwhelming force 
in the first Gulf War, Powell appeared to speak of force size and “decisive points” through a 
Clausewitzian lens, saying, “I've always talked about decisive force, meaning you go to the point 
of decision and that's where you apply decisive force.”225 Likewise, in his 1995 memoir, My 
American Journey, Powell acknowledged his application of Clausewitzian theory to Saddam 
Hussein’s invasion of Kuwait. He opposed the intervention, asking “if it was worth going to war 
to liberate Kuwait. It was a Clausewitzian question which I posed so that the military would 
know what preparations it might have to make.”226 While he was unable to convince President 
George H.W. Bush about first attempting economic means to coerce Saddam, his “decisive 
force” policy was implemented; an army of 550,000 soldiers quickly decimated the Iraqi army, 
pushing it out of Kuwait.227 The Powell Doctrine’s emphasis on large force size was also evident 
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two years earlier, when the Air Force and 20,000 U.S. troops successfully ousted Panamanian 
dictator Manuel Noriega.228  
 Yet, despite the success of the Powell Doctrine, it was not implemented in Afghanistan. 
In 2001, Powell was the Secretary of State, a position that put him in the Situation Room 
alongside the Commander in Chief for key national security decisions. Furthermore, while he 
was best positioned to implement it, Powell was not the only one who advocated for a larger 
initial deployment. Richard Haass, Senior diplomat and coordinator of the U.S. policy towards 
Afghanistan under President Bush, said he strongly recommended an initial deployment of 
20,000-25,000 troops, but his plan was turned down, as President Bush favored the light 
footprint approach Defense Secretary Rumsfeld and Vice President Cheney supported.229 While 
the problematic aspects of the post-war Afghan government may have occurred independent of 
military progress, had Colin Powell’s intervention framework – or a similar plan – been 
implemented, the counterinsurgency in Afghanistan likely would have been more successful. 
Conclusion 
Clausewitz acknowledged the potential political limitations on force size in Book 3, 
Chapter Eight (“Superiority of Numbers”), writing that force size would “be decided by the 
government...the general who is to command the army in the field usually has to accept the size 
of his forces as a given factor. Either he was not consulted in the matter, or circumstances may 
have prevented the raising of a sufficiently large force.”230 Likewise, Chapter 11 of Book 3 
(“Concentration of Forces in Space”) expresses a similar allusion to political influence on 
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military operations: “The effort needed to create military strength...does not always emanate 
from the general.”231 In both the Soviet and American wars in Afghanistan, political 
considerations repeatedly overruled the views of military leaders. 
It is important to acknowledge that an increased force size could have led to negative 
consequences that would have hampered the counterinsurgency effort in each conflict. Greater 
foreign troop presence might have angered the populace and led to an increase in domestic 
support for the Taliban and other insurgent groups.232 Likewise, more soldiers and attempts at 
concentrating them at decisive points may not have led to achieving military objectives. 
Afghanistan has been plagued with numerous issues – such as governance capability and 
corruption, all of which have made pursuing military aims difficult.233 But it is true that, had a 
Clausewitzian force model been applied, there would have been a far greater troop presence at 
the beginning of the conflict, concentrated in the areas of the country that were most at risk for 
insurgent activity. This, in turn, may have resulted in a greater period of time for the Afghan 
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Chapter III 
 Changing War Aims  
“When the decision is made to employ our forces in combat, the committee should ask, [...] 
‘Are the political objectives clearly defined and achievable?” - General Jim Mattis, Speaking 
before the Senate Armed Services Committee, January 2015234 
 
In On War, Carl Von Clausewitz advocated for a careful parity between political and 
military war aims and means, warning that a failure to align the methods with the intended goals 
would lead to an inability to accomplish military objectives. Testing this concept with the wars in 
Afghanistan reveals its validity and highlights the shortcomings of two superpowers who 
incorrectly estimated their war aims and the costs it would take to achieve them. The Soviet and 
American experiences in Afghanistan were marred by significant miscalculations of their 
objectives both at the outset of each conflict, and as the wars progressed. Significantly, the 
mismatching – and at times, lack of clarity – between the methods and aims transpired in 
different ways for the Soviets and Americans.  
During the crucial early period of the Soviet invasion, the Soviet leadership expected 
Soviet troops to play a cursory role in Afghanistan’s internal affairs. As a result, they understated 
their military objectives and provided insufficient resources to address the dissension the DRA 
government was struggling to eradicate. Conversely, the U.S. initially overstated its objectives 
and failed to adequately clarify them for the military and political actors that were tasked with 
executing them. In both cases, the historical record reveals multiple attempts to modify the war 
aims in an effort to bring the goals closer to feasibility. But as Chapter Two already discussed, 
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the number of forces deployed and their lack of concentration never matched the needs of each 
counterinsurgency. 
Clausewitz on Allies Providing Military Support     
 
In Book 8, Chapter 6 (“The Effect of the Political Aim on the Military Objective”), 
Clausewitz discusses pacts of mutual support between allies.235 His observations are remarkable 
for their insights on the military relations between two states. In particular, Clausewitz pays 
attention to the nature of the relationship between a country that sends its troops to assist an ally, 
and the country that receives this support. The state that deploys its troops – usually a contingent 
of thirty to forty thousand, in Clausewitz’s estimation – in support of another country’s cause, 
retains control of its army: “The auxiliary force, usually operates under its own commander; he is 
dependent only on his own government.”236 For the assisting state, “the affair is more like a 
business deal,” and “even when both [states] share a major interest, action is clogged with 
diplomatic reservations.”237 Clausewitz appears to want to present this uneven relationship as a 
principle of war, acknowledging that it is “a practice deeply rooted in the frailties and 
shortcomings of the human race.”238 Yet it appears that he stops short of doing so because of his 
personal experiences.  
Having witnessed the rise of Napoleon, Clausewitz came to the conclusion that there 
were certain circumstances in which an extreme danger forced nations “to act in a natural 
manner” and form strong, genuine alliances.239 Barring such unique developments – comparable 
perhaps only to the rise of Hitler during the Second World War – Clausewitz’s perspective on 
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troop deployments in allied nations highlights the unwillingness of countries to make their 
neighbor’s wars their own. This viewpoint is tied to one of On War’s most central concepts: the 
primacy of politics over armed conflict.240 Political motivations are at the core of war aims, since 
they provide the meaning and parameters for war. According to Antulio Echevarria, “Clausewitz 
demonstrated that, without the overarching influence of purpose, the elements of violence, aim, 
and effort have no inherent logical limits.”241 But Clausewitz’s theory of war did not merely 
identify the conjunction of war and politics. Throughout On War, he explained how the 
alignment of political objectives and the use of force could work to a nation’s benefit, and how 
errors along this nexus could lead to military failure.  
In Book One, Chapter One (“What is War?”), Clausewitz writes that the political 
objectives – or aims – “determine both the military objective to be reached and the amount of 
effort it requires.”242 While the political aims may determine the amount of effort required to 
achieve them, this does not mean that this amount of effort will be applied. Clausewitz cautions 
that political objectives in warfare cannot be evaluated absent the interaction of two warring 
parties. They must be evaluated through “the influences [political objectives] can exert upon the 
forces it is meant to move.”243 According to Christopher Griffin, “Clausewitz argues that the 
political goals must necessarily limit the military objectives. His theory goes beyond war as a 
continuation of politics to show that politics will in fact limit war.”244 However, a close reading 
of Clausewitz suggests that this is how he believed political aims should limit war, as opposed to 
what may actually occur.  
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In Chapter Three, Book Eight (“Scale of the Military Objective and of the Effort To Be 
Made”), Clausewitz makes a seemingly instructive statement about the relationship between 
political objectives and the use of force that is of an actualistic nature: “The degree of force that 
must be used against the enemy depends on the scale of political demands on either side. These 
demands… would show what efforts each must take; but they seldom are fully known.”245 In the 
Soviet war in Afghanistan, the political demands of the mujahideen were well known. While the 
factions that battled the Soviets and D.R.A. forces followed different strands of Islam and were 
often at odds with one another, they all sought to will the Soviets out of Afghanistan and 
overthrow the communist regime in Kabul. Likewise, in the U.S. war in Afghanistan, the Taliban 
were public about their intentions to seize power from the Karzai government, push the U.S. and 
its allies out of Afghanistan, and enforce a strict interpretation of Sharia law. The difficulty in 
both wars arose largely with the incongruity and/or unintelligibility of the counterinsurgents' 
own war aims.  
The instructive nature of Clausewitz’s views on war aims is further seen in the 
introductory note Clausewitz added after writing the first draft of On War. While his planned 
revision of the text was never completed due to his untimely death, his intention in writing this 
addendum was to introduce the guiding principles that would shape his edits. Clausewitz wrote: 
War can be of two kinds, in the sense that either the objective is to overthrow the 
enemy - to render him politically helpless or militarily impotent, thus forcing him to sign 
whatever peace we please; or merely to occupy some of his frontier-districts so that we can 
annex them or use them for bargaining at the peace negotiations...the fact that the aims of the 
two types are quite different must be clear at all times, and their points of irreconcilability 
brought out.246 
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Here, Clausewitz lays out a dichotomy of war aims that acknowledges a variance in 
military objectives. The examples he provides – complete overthrow of the enemy, or a partial 
occupation – set up a spectrum of potential aims, which he mentions in Book One, Chapter One: 
“Wars can have all degrees of importance and intensity, ranging from a war of extermination 
down to simple armed observation.”247 In Understanding War: History and Theory of Combat, 
military historian Colonel Trevor Nevitt Dupuy offers a concise synthesis of Clausewitz’s 
conceptual war aims framework: 
War can be total, or War can be limited. When the ends of war are total (i.e., the 
overthrow of the opponent or survival against such an effort), the means will be violent to the 
utmost capability of the contestants. If the ends of war are less than the overthrow of the 
enemy, then the means will be less violent.248 
Dupuy’s summation could be enhanced by incorporating an additional facet Clausewitz 
identifies in the expansive discussion of armed conflict in Book One, Chapter One (“The Diverse 
Nature of War”). In this section, Clausewitz asserts that “more powerful and inspiring… motives 
for war” lead to a greater emphasis on “the destruction of the enemy,” which leads to a parity 
between military and political aims, with the war taking on a more military focus.249 Conversely, 
“the less intense the motives, the less will the military’s natural tendency to violence coincide 
with political directives… the conflict will seem increasingly political in character.”250 This 
additional element provides a complete picture for evaluating the changing war aims of the 
belligerents in the Soviet and American wars in Afghanistan (see Figure 1). The rest of this 
chapter will identify how Soviet and American war aims did not match the means employed 
between their respective culminating points and counterinsurgent acceptance points.   
 
247 Ibid., 91.  
248 T.N. Dupuy, Understanding War: History and Theory of Combat (UK: Leo Cooper, 1992), 24. 
249 Clausewitz, On War, 99.  
250 Ibid. 
  75 
 
Figure 1. Clausewitz’s spectrum of war aims. If a war was fought for limited aims, such as 
obtaining leverage for peace negotiations, then it should be a more political conflict that utilizes 
limited means, such as occupying several provinces to gain an advantage. If a war was fought 
for unlimited or very broad aims, such as disarming an enemy or completely breaking their will 
to contest one’s power, then the military and political objectives should align entirely, and the 
military’s precedence would make the conflict appear markedly less political.251   
 
Soviet War Aims at the Culminating Point 
 When the Politburo decided to intervene in Afghanistan, they established very limited 
war aims, despite being cognizant of the rapidly declining security situation the D.R.A. 
government was experiencing throughout the country. While the Soviet military was able to meet 
these initial objectives, they were unable to achieve the broader political and military aims that 
they were tasked with immediately after the culminating point. The main reason for this was a 
gross overestimation of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan’s own military capabilities, and 
an underestimation of the threat posed by the mujahideen.  
The Herat uprising was an indicator that the Soviet Union’s aims – and the means they 
planned to use to achieve them – were not reflective of the situation on the ground. Prior to 
March 1979 – nine months before the Soviet invasion – the city of Herat was home to many of 
the Soviet advisors who assisted the fledgling communist regime in its social, economic, and 
political development.252 Geographically distant from Pakistan and the tribal areas that were 
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already dissenting from the Taraki government, Herat’s military division (the 17th Infantry) was 
considered especially reliable by the Soviet advisors who resided in the city.253 Yet, on March 
14, 1979, Herat became the site of the first major anticommunist uprising that resulted in Soviet 
casualties.  
While what sparked the revolt is unknown, the historical record indicates the uprising 
started in the rural outskirts of the city and quickly spread to the urban parts of the province.254 
The protestors, chanting anticommunist slogans, attacked the homes of PDPA officials and 
Soviets, killing who they could find and setting fire to their homes and the Party buildings.255 
The violent rebellion surprised both Moscow and Kabul, but the aspect that was perhaps most 
ominous was the treachery of the 17th Infantry Division:   
Even in the division, which was considered to be one of the most reliable and loyal to 
the PDPA, the influence of the mullahs had proven stronger than the soldiers’ dedication to the 
new Afghan regime. After the artillery units fired upon the crowd approaching the military 
base, the cannons were turned around and began to fire upon the barracks and the base itself. 
Two days later, the detachments of almost the entire division had either sided with the rebels 
or simply deserted.256 
 
While the Soviets and DRA troops took back control of the suburbs and main road, they 
never reclaimed the old city from the mujahideen.257 Beyond the transformation of Herat from a 
stable province to a hotbed of insurgent activity, this initial uprising also articulated all the 
elements of future Soviet miscalculation regarding political and military war aims. For one, the 
rebellion showed the appeal of the mujahideen’s message to a broad swath of Afghanistan’s 
civilians. Likewise, it demonstrated the quickness with which violence could overtake the limited 
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force size on the ground. The most foreboding message the Herat uprising sent out, however, 
was the unreliability of Afghan government troops, many of whom had a greater allegiance to 
their faith than to the PDPA’s political agenda, or were willing to switch sides for their own 
safety. By initially sending in a limited contingent of troops to address an unlimited war effort in 
which civilians and federal troops were willing to join the insurgents, the Soviet Union failed to 
follow Clausewitz’s war aims framework.  
The incongruity between Soviet war aims and “the scale of political demands” by the 
mujahideen became even more apparent when the Soviet army reached its culminating point in 
February 1980.258 At this point in the war, the Soviets had secured the major cities, 
communication centers, and roads, but had no plans to pursue the resistance fighters in the 
insurgent hotspots across the country. This task was instead given to the badly equipped and 
poorly trained DRA forces.259 Beyond the lack of soldiers after numerous desertions, the DRA 
army had a deficient training program and struggled with the operation of Soviet weaponry.260 
Likewise, the officer class was rife with nepotism and corruption; the possibility of mujahideen 
sympathizers across the ranks made the Soviets reluctant to share intel and work closely with 
their Afghan counterparts.261 Nevertheless, as Lester Grau and Michael Gress observed, the DRA 
forces “were supposed to take on the bulk of the combat.”262 
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Beyond the inability of the domestic forces to employ the means necessary to contest the 
mujahideen, the Soviet army’s own troops were not prepared for an expansion of the war aims at 
the time they were deployed. The first regiments were drawn from the two military districts 
nearest to Afghanistan, which had never been tasked with any deployment of this size.263 
Furthermore, in an effort to maintain the secrecy of the operation, they were told they were being 
mobilized only for training exercises, which resulted in a hastily-created group of units that were 
deficient in specialists and were filled mostly with inexperienced, poorly-trained troops.264 After 
February 1980, when the Soviet leadership realized it would have to lead the way in conducting 
counterinsurgency operations, its own army was not prepared for the endeavor.  
Soviet War Aims at the Counterinsurgent Acceptance Point 
 Up until the Counterinsurgent Acceptance Point in January 1987, the Soviets expanded 
their war aims to include directly engaging the insurgents outside of major cities and roads. 
While this led to an expansion of means with the increase in force size and the precedence of 
military operations throughout the country, it was insufficient to end the insurgency, as the 
mujahideen were by then extensively supported by the United States and others. The 
counterinsurgent acceptance point marked a return to a more political conflict; the DRA 
modified its war aims and began to abandon a strictly military solution to the war by seeking a 
political compromise.  
 Attempts to remove the insurgent threat emanating from Pakistan provide support for 
Clausewitz’s war aims concept. After an expansion of the military aims failed, the Soviet Union 
pressed for a political solution to the issue. As early as September 1981, Soviet intelligence was 
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aware of the uptick in the arms supplies and training the mujahideen were receiving from their 
allies, and attempted to appropriately adjust their objectives.265 The following year, General 
Victor F. Ermakov was tasked with sealing off Afghanistan’s borders with Pakistan and Iran, 
through which flowed the insurgents and arms. Given the extensive length of the border and the 
many entry points, this proved impossible.266 Clausewitz’s war aims framework suggests that the 
failure of a military solution would result in a switch from primarily military means to more 
political ones, which is what occurred. 
Throughout the war, stemming the tide of insurgents and supplies from Pakistan was a 
key military objective, but the failure of expanded military aims to address the issue meant the 
political sphere took precedence, and became a limiting factor on the military goals. During a 
1985 meeting of Communist Party officials in General Secretary Gorbachev’s office, Gorbachev 
told his colleagues about his attempts to exert diplomatic pressure on Pakistan to end its support 
for the insurgency at a recent meeting, saying he “put quite serious pressure on [President of 
Pakistan] Zia Ul Haq,” telling him “it is precisely from those camps located inside Pakistan, 
from Pakistani territory, that the main war is being waged against those Afghan people friendly 
to us, as well as against the limited contingent of Soviet troops.”267 Gorbachev told President Zia 
that Pakistan would be threatened by the Soviet Union if they did not cease their support for the 
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mujahideen.268 The following year, “the Politburo discussed conducting a 'secret exchange of 
ideas' with Pakistan regarding the possibility of expanding the Kabul government by inviting 
émigrés to participate. These talks expanded through 1987, and included meetings on the deputy-
ministerial level.”269 While these diplomatic overtures were ultimately unsuccessful, the 
prioritization of political means after the failure of military operations supports Clausewitz’s war 
aims framework, and indicated the Counterinsurgent Acceptance Point was on the horizon.  
Clausewitz’s connection between a decrease in war aims and an increase in the political 
nature of the conflict was also apparent in the diplomatic bargaining that defined the later period 
of the war. A CPSU memorandum for October 1986 links the drawdown of 15 Soviet regiments 
deployed to Afghanistan with “corresponding steps from [the Chinese] who are participating in 
an undeclared war against the DRA.”270 By this point in the war, the Soviets were no longer 
focused on clearly defined military objectives such as establishing control over areas of insurgent 
activity or sealing the border with Pakistan. Instead, they were occupied with political quid pro 
quo as they attempted to secure the DRA government – a more limited objective than ending the 
insurgency – while planning their withdrawal.  
Militarily, the period leading up to the Counterinsurgent Acceptance Point saw an 
increase in the number of DRA and DRA-led missions.271 As the 40th army had done when it 
first intervened in Afghanistan, the Soviets attempted to play a supportive role in military 
operations against the mujahideen after years of training and equipping their Afghan 
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counterparts. While the transfer of military objectives to the DRA forces can be seen as an effort 
to maintain the same war aims, ceding the objectives to a lesser military force because of the 
USSR’s military failure and political stresses amounts to an abandonment of the war aims. As 
Artemy Kalinovsky described, “By early 1987 it had started to become clear that the situation in 
Afghanistan was worse than Moscow had thought. The economy was ruined, Najib[ullah] was 
isolated in the government, and a withdrawal was no closer than it had been in October 1985.”272 
The National Reconciliation Policy and transfer of military responsibility to the DRA Army were 
the signs of an increasingly limited, political conflict.  
Clausewitz’s war aims framework is not only supported by the trajectory of the Soviet 
war in Afghanistan, but it also reveals some nuances in the failed Soviet war effort. The Soviets 
experienced particular difficulties when they sought to wage a limited war with nearly unlimited 
aims. Their attempts at expanding their limited means were insufficient to achieve their 
objectives. This led to a lowering of military and political aims. As the political demands were 
scaled back, so was the amount of force used, and the war took on a more political nature. 
However, this did not mean that the Soviets capitulated to the demands of the insurgents. 
Through their financial and arms support of the DRA, they continued to support the war against 
the mujahideen after the withdrawal.273  
U.S. War Aims at the Culminating Point 
 In contrast to the Soviet Union’s relatively modest initial war aims, the United States and 
its allies announced nearly unlimited political and military objectives upon invading 
Afghanistan. The means deployed after the Culminating Point in December 2001, however, were 
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too limited to address the aims. Likewise, the political objectives were unclear for those in 
charge of implementing them, which contributed to a gradual and uncoordinated retreat from the 
unlimited aims. This led up to the Counterinsurgent Acceptance Point in September 2007, which 
– as with the Soviets in January 1987 – marked a shift away from a military resolution to a 
political agreement.  
 President George W. Bush’s announcement of the beginning of Operation Enduring 
Freedom (OEF) in October 2001 presented the U.S. military with a unique set of long-term 
objectives that it was unprepared for. During the previous decade, the U.S. Department of 
Defense had been developing the capabilities of the armed forces specifically to handle two 
major theater conflicts simultaneously, as opposed to developing capabilities to address limited 
guerilla wars.274 Furthermore, OEF was announced less than a month after the events of 9/11 and 
was part of the global War on Terror, a far-reaching and vague endeavor. As David Kassing and 
Walter Perry observed, for military leaders at the time, “only cursory attention was given to 
planning post-conflict operations. The objective in the 1990s was to push the enemy back into 
his own territory, not to depose his government and replace it.”275 Perhaps for these reasons – 
and the overwhelming shock of the 9/11 tragedy – the long-term aims set out in October 2001 
were broad and unclear.  
Furthermore, in contrast to Clausewitz’s war aims framework, the political objectives did 
not lend themselves to military aims. President Bush’s address to a joint session of Congress on 
September 20th, 2001 laid out the thematic aims of the War on Terror. “Any nation that 
continues to harbor or support terrorism will be regarded by the United States as a hostile 
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regime,” he said,  promising that the transnational conflict would “not end until every terrorist 
group of global reach has been found, stopped and defeated.”276 The objectives laid out by 
Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld in his 2002 report to the President and Congress were 
more specific, but were still broad enough to suggest that the conflict in Afghanistan would be an 
unlimited war, thereby calling for nearly unlimited means: “The Secretary of Defense outlined 
the objectives of the military operations: 
(1) To make clear to the Taliban leaders and their supporters that harboring terrorists is 
unacceptable and carries a price; 
(2) To acquire intelligence to facilitate future operations against al Qaeda and the Taliban 
regime that harbors the terrorists; 
(3) To develop relationships with groups in Afghanistan that oppose the Taliban regime and 
the foreign terrorists that they support; 
(4) To make it increasingly difficult for the terrorists to use Afghanistan freely as a base of 
operation; 
(5) To alter the military balance over time by denying to the Taliban the offensive systems 
that hamper the progress of the various opposition forces; and 
(6) To provide humanitarian relief to Afghans suffering truly oppressive living conditions 
under the Taliban regime.277 
For the short-term goals – removing the Taliban from power in Afghanistan – the U.S. 
was able to achieve them utilizing limited means. U.S. Special Forces joined members of the 
Northern Alliance in attacking Taliban strongholds through a series of offensive operations and 
airstrikes.278 But the long-term objectives, which were a mix of political and military goals, 
proved to be much more difficult to achieve. The 2002 report alluded to the nation-building 
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aspect of the war, adding: “Even after the fall of the Taliban regime, the task in Afghanistan is 
far from complete… the United States will help the new government of Afghanistan.”279 
The key element of that were lacking – which Clausewitz’s war aims framework implies as a 
necessary part of any military endeavor – is the clarity of aims, and the political and military 
means to reach them.  
The Afghanistan Papers, released in 2019 as part of a Freedom of Information suit by the 
Washington Post, shed light on the lack of clear war aims the U.S. military struggled with 
immediately after the culminating point. The Papers consisted of numerous private interviews 
the Office of the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR) held with 
the officials who oversaw the war effort, as part of the agency’s advisory project entitled 
“Lessons Learned.”280 Investigative journalist Craig Whitlock explained: 
At the outset...the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan had a clear, stated objective – to 
retaliate against al-Qaeda and prevent a repeat of the Sept. 11, 2001 attacks. Yet the interviews 
show that as the war dragged on, the goals and mission kept changing… Fundamental 
disagreements went unresolved. Some U.S. officials wanted to use the war to turn Afghanistan 
into a democracy. Others wanted to transform Afghan culture and elevate women’s rights. Still 
others wanted to reshape the regional balance of power among Pakistan, India, Iran and 
Russia.281   
The confusion surrounding the war aims only increased with time. President Obama 
adopted a different strategy that featured a troop surge and a tight timeline for withdrawal, but 
the war aims were never constructively reassessed.282 In one interview with SIGAR, former 
Ambassador to NATO Nicholas Burns remarked, “After ‘03-04, once we were fully engaged in 
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both wars [Iraq and Afghanistan], I can’t remember us ever saying, ‘Should we be there? Are we 
being useful? Are we succeeding?”283 An unidentified NATO liaison put it more bluntly in his 
interview with a SIGAR official: “It was never fully clear in our own minds what the established 
goals and timelines were.”284  
Despite the misgivings many government officials had about the lack of direction in the 
war in Afghanistan, the lack of clear war aims remained a serious issue between the culminating 
point and the Counterinsurgent Acceptance Point. The Powell Doctrine – the most cohesive 
alternative to the actual intervention in Afghanistan – may have led to different outcomes. In 
addition to the Doctrine’s emphasis on the concentration and use of decisive force – discussed in 
Chapter 2 – its other prongs called for concrete political and military objectives and a clearly 
defined exit strategy.285 However, due to the back seat role Powell played in the intervention as a 
result of Secretary Rumsfeld and Vice President Cheney’s involvement, it was not given serious 
consideration.286 
U.S. War Aims at the Counterinsurgent Acceptance Point 
By September 2007, the war in Afghanistan had intensified to the point that Afghan 
President Hamid Karzai announced his intention to seek peace talks with the Taliban.287 At the 
time, the United States and its allies had begun to realize that they could not win a war in which 
limited means were employed to achieve nearly unlimited aims. While military objectives 
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politically oriented conflict in which the U.S. could not seek a resolution to the war that left 
Afghanistan without a Taliban presence.  
Problems with clear objectives persisted – and may have even intensified – during this 
period. As Clausewitz’s war aims framework suggests, the result of unclear aims was a widening 
incongruence between political and military goals. In contrast to the first few years of the war, 
when Afghanistan was receiving less aid than most other recent humanitarian crises, the amount 
of economic and humanitarian assistance dispersed by the United States jumped to over USD$1 
billion in 2007 in an effort to shore up the political objectives of the United States.288 Yet, there 
were only small troop increases in 2007.289 Evidently, the light footprint approach was not 
abandoned until President Obama took office, delaying a troop surge until 2009, a date that some 
experts say was too late to be effective.290 
The public nature of President Karzai seeking to negotiate with the Taliban leadership 
should have been a sign that the conflict was becoming more limited and political in nature, but 
the complexity of U.S. war aims and the failure to acknowledge a lack of military progress 
prevented this. The result was a significant departure from the trajectory suggested by 
Clausewitz’s war aims framework. Despite the failure of military means, political attempts at 
conflict resolution were stymied by U.S. and coalition members. When President Karzai called 
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for negotiations in September 2007, he was opposed by officials in Washington.291 This response 
by Afghanistan’s allies mirrored earlier instances in which the Taliban could have been engaged 
with diplomatically. 
In the international conferences and meetings held between 2001 to 2003 to construct an 
Afghan government, the Taliban were left out despite the readiness of some leaders to participate 
in the talks.292 Likewise, in January 2007, when President Karzai expressed willingness to “open 
the door for talks and negotiations” without mentioning the Taliban by name, NATO Secretary 
General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer said, “You can’t negotiate with them. I can’t imagine that NATO 
would negotiate with people who kill children or teachers in school.”293 As a result, by failing to 
shift to political means after the failure of military operations, the U.S. and their allies departed 
from Clausewitz’s war aims framework. Considering it was not until 2010 that the U.S. 
expressed any willingness to pursue peace talks, this could potentially be responsible for the 
extension of the conflict.  
Further evidence of this can be found in the many public statements made by senior U.S. 
military officials around the time of the Counterinsurgent Acceptance Point. Despite widespread 
disillusionment with the war effort, the U.S. and its allies continued to present the 
counterinsurgency and state-building efforts as successes. In September 2008, while privately 
asking for larger troop deployments to stem the number of insurgent attacks, Major General 
Jeffrey Schloesser said, “We’re making some steady progress.”294 By intentionally not allowing 
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non-military means to take precedence after multiple military failures to counter the insurgency, 
the U.S. prolonged the time it took for both peace negotiations to become a viable option, and for 
war aims to be reduced to match the reality on the ground.295 While both of these results 
occurred after the Counterinsurgent Acceptance Point, the “holding out” period was not a 
strategic effort to better position the U.S. and allies against the Taliban. Instead, it signified a 
procedural failure to appropriately assess the progress of military and political objectives, which 
Clausewitz’s framework requires. 
Conclusion 
 Both Soviet and American war aims in Afghanistan suffered from incompatibility with 
the progress – or lack thereof – that was occuring in each conflict. The Soviets incorrectly 
expected the DRA army to handle the insurgency on two occasions: when they first invaded, and 
when they committed to withdrawal. As Clausewitz’s war aims framework suggests, their own 
efforts at achieving broad military objectives – controlling all parts of the country, sealing the 
porous border – proved unsuccessful, leading to the war’s evolution to a more political conflict, 
marked by negotiations and diplomatic quid pro quo. Unlike the Soviets, the U.S. did not expect 
their Afghan allies to lead the military operations once the insurgency began to spread 
throughout the provinces, but they failed – or refused – to recognize when their own COIN 
efforts were not making genuine progress. The reluctance to pursue non-military means of 
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conflict resolution, and the influx of aid during and after the Counterinsurgent Acceptance Point 
may have prolonged the trend suggested by Clausewitz’s war aims framework, and seen in the 
Soviet war in Afghanistan. 
Beyond allowing us to better understand shifts within the Soviet and American war plans 
that may not be apparent without a conceptual framework, the Afghanistan case studies support a 
different perspective on Clausewitz’s major contribution to the study of war: the view that armed 
conflict is a continuation of policy by other means. The wars in Afghanistan show the 
bidirectional nature of his observation. War is an extension of politics, but when war does not go 
in one’s favor, a return to politics is – or should be – attempted. While this concept may appear 
simple, in the U.S. war the denial and concealment of military failure prevented the pursuit of 
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Conclusion 
 “Guerilla war does not fit into the popular image of high-tech future war, but it may well be the 
future war that a high-tech country finds itself fighting.” - Brigadier General Theodore C. 
Mataxis296 
 
Summary of Findings 
By viewing the concepts in On War in connection to modern conflicts, we can see 
contemporary expressions of timeless principles about warfare and international relations. 
Seeking to connect current scholarship about Afghanistan and other insurgencies to Clausewitz 
can bolster more recent analyses that offer explanations for these conflicts. There is a lot of 
research that investigates the cultural, political, and military problems that have plagued 
Afghanistan for decades, but as Clausewitz said himself, “Whoever relies purely on the 
perspectives of his own times is inclined to treat what is most recent as best.”297 This study 
sought to bridge the gap between today’s research and classical military theory. Since On War is 
an unfinished text, extracting its conceptual frameworks required an intensive study of its many 
parts and the interpretations of experts on Clausewitz’s life and views. The three aspects of 
Clausewitz’s theory of war that were tested in this study revealed where the Soviets and 
Americans erred, and also where contemporary war outstripped Clausewitzian theory of its use.   
In Chapter 1, I identified the potential culminating point – defined as the furthest point of 
defensible extension within a campaign or an entire war – for the Soviet and American forces in 
Afghanistan. I concluded that the armies were militarily best situated in February 1980 and 
December 2001, respectively. These dates marked when prospects for both counterinsurgents 
were at their peak, but they also signified when the insurgency became a viable threat and 
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unsuccessful COIN operations commenced. Since culminating points are not applicable to 
insurgent warfare, I presented an effectual equivalent called the Counterinsurgent Acceptance 
Point (CAP), defined as the point in time when the counterinsurgent first publicly announces a 
willingness to negotiate with the insurgent faction. Since the CAP signifies an important 
departure from the initial objectives to defeat the insurgency militarily, it represents the denial of 
the counterinsurgents’ will by the insurgents. I concluded that January 1987 and September 2007 
were the CAPs for the Soviets and Americans, respectively. Taken together, these four dates 
allow for a standardized model for comparative analysis that identifies when the U.S. and Soviet 
Union were similarly positioned in Afghanistan.  
In Chapter 2, I evaluated Clausewitz’s view that invading forces require overwhelming 
mass and concentration at a “decisive point” to have the best chance at defeating their enemies. I 
argued that this view applied to Afghanistan. Both culminating points represented the decisive 
point opportunity, and both counterinsurgents failed to deploy enough troops at this time against 
the opinions of Grand Marshal Ogarkov and General Colin Powell, the leading military officials. 
Instead, troops were kept in the most stable parts of the country, and brief forays into rebel 
territory did not lead to the collapse of the insurgency, as the resistance fighters would return to 
the area upon the departure of the counterinsurgents. Analysis of troop deployments and 
associated factors between the culminating point and the CAP revealed how both superpowers 
escalated the conflict only after the insurgencies became larger, better trained, and well funded.  
In Chapter 3, I considered the decisions made by the U.S. and USSR in the context of 
Clausewitz’s instructive war aims framework, which called for a strict parity between means and 
military and political objectives. The spectral framework also suggested an increase in the 
political nature of a conflict as the aims and means became more limited. Paul Schuurman’s 
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articulation of the war aims framework summarizes the intended flow of conflict, as detailed in 
On War: “Politics is the context for a series of escalating and de-escalating mechanisms that can 
drive the intensity of war upward and downward.”298 I concluded that the Soviet Union initially 
underestimated the military aims when they invaded in December 1979, only to later revise their 
objectives while keeping the number of troops committed below the necessary amount. In 
contrast, the U.S. initially overstated their objectives while also devoting insufficient resources. 
Furthermore, whereas the Soviet Union began to negotiate soon after the CAP, the United States 
withheld its support for negotiations after the political arm of the counterinsurgency, the local 
government, announced it was willing to hold talks with the Taliban. 
Clausewitz was correct in his descriptions of inter-state military relations. For both the 
Soviet and American leadership, the war in Afghanistan did not transcend into the rare type of 
conflict that would cause one state to wholly adopt another’s cause as its own. Ultimately, the 
Soviets knew that while there would be negative consequences for the spread of communist 
ideology, the instability and even downfall of a neighboring communist regime would not 
threaten their own sovereignty. The U.S., along with its international coalition of allies, remains 
concerned for the stability of the Afghan state, but has wavered on the amount of aid and length 
of time it is willing to commit to the troubled regime. In these contemporary conflicts, it appears 
that the term “asymmetry” has defined not only the type of warfare that is seen on the ground, 
but also the differences between the motivations of intervening powers and client states.  
Beyond Clausewitz 
This study sought to compare the Soviet and American wars in Afghanistan in order to 
evaluate Clausewitz’s applicability to contemporary conflicts and better understand both wars. 
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False equivalencies and parallels often plague events that bear regional or contextual similarities 
to one another. Seeking to avoid overstatement of the congruence between both wars, the 
parallels and divergences of how the Soviets and Americans waged war in Afghanistan were 
emphasized only when the historical record profoundly indicated them. 
The findings suggest that a more sober initial assessment of the force size necessary to 
handle a conflict with the potential of becoming an insurgency could have led to different 
outcomes for the Soviets and Americans. Or, it could have led to the adoption of more limited 
war aims. Ultimately, the policy of responsive (as opposed to preemptive) escalation – indicated 
by the aid and force size increases that occurred after the growth of the insurgency – put both 
superpowers behind the insurgent’s operating curve. However, an adherence to Clausewitz’s 
theories was not out of reach for either the Soviet or American leadership. In both instances, 
military generals strongly advocated against small footprint models and escalatory strategies. 
The disregard given to Generals Colin Powell and Nikolai Ogarkov is perhaps indicative of a 
larger lack of attention paid to the informed opinions of military leaders when it is not politically 
expedient.299 While what is known about Ogarkov’s views is less detailed than Powell’s, at their 
core both plans shared an adherence to a Clausewitzian model of force size. 
 Additionally, both nations had prior experiences with rapid interventions that achieved 
their military objectives. While the First Gulf War was an immense military success that 
included the use of a decisive force, the best example for military intervention that led to regime 
change was the U.S. invasion of Panama in 1989. The effort was led by then Chairman of the 
Joint Chiefs Colin Powell, who utilized decisive force by sending in the Air Force and 20,000 
U.S. troops to overthrow Panamanian dictator Manuel Noriega and install a new government.300 
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For the Soviet Union, their prior experience was the 1968 invasion of Czechoslovakia. 
Technically a Warsaw Pact intervention, the largely Soviet force presence consisted of 
approximately 250,000 troops that successfully quelled a civilian uprising.301 Granted, both the 
Panama and Czechoslovakia interventions had significant differences from the Afghanistan 
insurgencies, such as the absence of a sanctuary and support foreign support. However, some of 
the same Soviet and American leaders who would endorse – or acquiesce to –  light footprint 
approaches in Afghanistan accepted the need for relatively larger force sizes in these conflicts.  
Afghanistan, therefore, represented a departure from military policies that were 
previously successful. While a thorough investigation of the reasons for this is outside of my 
project’s scope, a preliminary appraisal suggests two other wars heavily influenced the decision 
making that led to insufficient Soviet and American force presence in Afghanistan. The USSR’s 
thinking was guided by the U.S. experience during the Vietnam War: 
By restricting the size of its occupying forces, Moscow attempted to escape 
entanglement of the kind which had led Americans to commit more than half a million men in 
Vietnam...The Soviet contingent...was unable to compensate for the weakness of the Afghan 
army, especially since the Soviet troops, who had little taste for combat as well as being ill-
equipped and underfed, were restricted to ‘useful’ Afghanistan: the cities and main axes of 
communication.302         
The erroneous view that large force size was the reason for military failure in Vietnam may have 
also influenced the Bush administration’s policy towards Afghanistan, but the main factor in 
Afghanistan’s light footprint approach appears to have been the Administration’s intention to 
invade Iraq: 
 Even before the United States attacked Bin Laden at Tora Bora, the U.S. government 
began downsizing its commitment of resources to Afghanistan. While U.S. policymakers had 
been hesitant to provide assistance to Afghanistan from the beginning, the U.S. invasion of Iraq 
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ensured that Afghanistan would take a backseat in money, policy attention, and military and 
nonmilitary aid.303 
The repercussions of not prioritizing Afghanistan in the first years of the war are still being felt 
today. In both conflicts, the failure of later escalations in troops and resources indicate that 
“catching up” is a difficult endeavor. As a military policy, it should be avoided.   
 The many offensive counterinsurgent operations in Afghanistan have also revealed the 
ineffectiveness of seizing territory without the requisite number of troops to hold it. From the 
Soviets numerous invasions of the Panjshir Valley and Zhawar to NATO’s Operation Mountain 
Thrust, tactical successes often failed to translate into long-term victories because troops were 
withdrawn. While Clausewitz could not have offered such insurgency-specific advice in On War, 
the experiences of numerous commanders in Afghanistan indicate that any temporary occupation 
of land is merely a Pyrrhic victory.      
Limitations 
Clausewitz did not write On War with the intention of creating a field manual, but he did 
want it to be an instructive guide for military and political leaders.304 As Roger Ashley Leonard 
observed: “Shortly before his death, [Clausewitz] pointed out that he held at least the ‘ruling 
principles’ (Hauptlineamente) of his work to be true; in fact to be universally and internally true, 
since they were possessed of an ‘inherent necessity.’”305 This study and many others affirm the 
validity of some of his concepts, but the centuries since On War was published have seen 
developments that Clausewitz did not envision. The evolution of armed conflict has inevitably 
produced some limitations to his theory of war.  
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The debut of weapons of mass destruction in the 20th century took warfare into what 
Clausewitz would have only viewed as the theoretical realm. Nuclear weapons, for example, 
provide the kind of wholesale destruction that Clausewitz considered only possible in the 
abstract and philosophical “absolute war,” where no sphere of society was safe from  
annihilation.306 While no nuclear weapons have ever been used in Afghanistan, the nature of 
insurgent warfare – paired with modern weaponry – has led to massive humanitarian crises in 
which civilians and their livelihoods have become both purposeful and incidental targets of war.  
Contemporary war has also seen an expansion of the use of humanitarian aid and state-
building support in conjunction with military operations. On War suggests that Clausewitz had a 
more limited view of the support that one state can provide another. Both the Soviets and 
Americans invested heavily in developing Afghanistan’s infrastructure and civil society. This 
was done alongside active military operations as part of a grand – if vague and unmanageable – 
plan to shape the country in its image. Understandably a reflection of his time, Clausewitz’s 
writings on armed conflict do not address the military implications of humanitarian support and 
institutional development. Perhaps most significantly, the dual-role of soldier and aid distributor 
played by modern armies does not factor into Clausewitz’s theory of war. 
Yet, despite the historical constraints that are evident in a modern analysis of On War,  it 
appears that Clausewitz may have foreseen a future in which irregular war would be more 
prevalent: In Book Six, Chapter 26 (“The People in Arms”), he wrote that guerilla warfare was 
“not as yet very common.”307 This prescient allusion to a future defined by unconventional 
conflicts is one of the many intriguing comments that one can find in Clausewitz’s writings. It 
serves as a reminder to the reader that he knew there would be changes in the future his theories 
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could not account for. This study showed the benefit of identifying culminating points in 
evaluating the success of counterinsurgents, but the nature of irregular conflict made them 
inapplicable to insurgents. My concept of a Counterinsurgent’s Acceptance Point, however, built 
on Clausewitz’s attempts at identifying critical junctures in wars. By complementing culminating 
points, CAP is an expansion of Clausewitzian analysis that identifies a key moment 
counterinsurgents have often experienced.  
Areas for Further Research 
“Everything then depends on discovering the culminating point by the fine tact of 
judgment.,” wrote Clausewitz.308 While he probably meant this in regard to the military 
tacticians who lead armies, it applies to scholars who consider wars after they have occurred as 
well. Culminating points and Counterinsurgent Acceptance Points could be identified in other 
contemporary conflicts, such as the wars in Iraq and Syria, providing a standardized model for 
comparative conflict analysis. One potential area of research is a quantitative evaluation of when 
culminating and Counterinsurgent Acceptance Points occur in order to assess if there are any 
trends or patterns. In the case studies that were the focus of this project, the culminating points 
occurred 2-3 months after the initial invasion. The CAP occurred 6 years and 11 months after the 
culminating point for the Soviet Union, and 5 years and 9 months after the culminating point for 
the United States. The creation of a database with culminating points and CAPs for other wars 
would allow scholars to investigate whether there is statistical significance in the temporal 
location of either point.    
Another area for further research concerns the adoption or dismissal of the opinions given 
by senior military officials regarding armed interventions into other states. Both wars in 
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Afghanistan saw the implementation of strategies at odds with the advice of four-star generals. 
Are these anomalies? Or are they commonplace occurrences that can lead to tragic 
consequences? Further research into intervention deliberations is required.   
Carl von Clausewitz’s enduring legacy is a result of the ideas contained in On War. This 
study explored only a small portion of the dynamic and compelling theories found in the book. 
The text remains a valuable source of military theory that should continue to be studied by 
scholars and policymakers alike. The knowledge contained therein offers everyone an 
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